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The end of the Cold War and a decline in public and political acceptance for
military power has raised the questions in a number of nations over the continuing
need for compulsory military service. This thesis, therefore, develops a conceptual
model that shows the estimated effects of social, economic, political, and military
variables on the successful implementation of an all-voluntary armed force. The
research is based mainly on the experience of all-volunteer recruitment in the
United States and Great Britain and recent trends elsewhere, especially in Western
Europe. The main focus in this study is on economic considerations and the
question about the fit between different key components in the military
organization, the so-called "Military Design Factors." The model illustrates the
open-system character of the military organization and highlights the close
interrelationship between social, military, economic, and political elements in its
environment. This thesis provides a basis for the design of a quantitative model
that could be used to assess whether a specific country with compulsory military
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Since the end of the Cold War, the political environment, especially in Western
Europe, has changed significantly. As a result, an increasing proportion of society in
many countries believe that it is no longer necessary to maintain a relatively large force.
Budget cuts and a decline in public and political acceptance for military power exert
enormous pressure on government and defense planners to reduce their military force size
and redefine national security policies. The need to reevaluate required defense
capability, strategy, and structure is intensifying as nations face new challenges in a new
world order. The approaches used to solve these problems vary between nations because
of differences in their military systems, missions, force requirements, and budget
constraints, as well as differences in social and political attitudes toward the armed
forces. As Eliot A. Cohen writes: "Nations adopt systems of military service to meet
two kinds of demands, those of external necessity—the constraints placed on states by
their participation in world politics, their status as sovereign members of the state system,
and their location on the globe-and those of ideology." (Cohen, 1985, p. 25)
B. THE PROBLEM OF DOWNSIZING
Force downsizing is an especially important issue for countries with compulsory
military service. Besides the issues of maintaining defense capability, military readiness,
and force effectiveness, countries that use military conscription additionally face the
problem of how to distribute the burdens of service equally among their citizens. Given
the condition of a growing or constant population base and declining force strength, it is
1
impossible for all in the relevant age group to share the burden equally. Karl W. Haltiner
(1997) found, in an empirical analysis of the structural changes in Western European
armed forces, that the "Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohort"
(MPRMAC) 1 in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands dropped from
50 percent in the period 1987-1991 to below 25 percent in 1995. According to Haltiner,
it is expected that these numbers will further drop until the year 2000. At the same time,
Richard V.L. Cooper (1977) finds that defense planners have the following options at
their disposal to deal with the equity issue:
1
.
Decrease the length of time a conscript must serve in the active military
force.
2. Devise an offset procedure in which those who are inducted receive some
special compensation, while those who do not have to serve pay an extra
tax.
3. End the compulsory service in favor of all-volunteer recruitment.
4. Ignore the problem.
Countries have used each of these options in recent years, and there are still
nations that ignore the new political and geostrategic circumstances. A growing number
of countries have either considered or actually converted from a draft system to all-
volunteer recruitment. Nevertheless, the most generally popular option, and the one
usually implemented first, has been a reduction in the length of time a conscript must
serve (Cooper, 1977). Germany, for example, reduced the length of service for
conscription from 1 8 months to ten months in 1 995 and is considering a further reduction
to six months. By decreasing the length of involuntary service, the flow of conscripts
through the military can be increased so that a large number of individuals can participate
'Haltiner (1997) defines the MPRMAC as the percentage of drafted individuals in a particular age group of
the total population (such as 18-32 years old or 22-32 years old).
in a country's defense. But a reduction of tour length involves cost and can have a
seriously detrimental effect on military capability and readiness. Shorter tour length
increases the cost of training and leads to a decline in the number of experienced soldiers
in the active force. This fact is important because, as Walter Y. Oi (1996) observes,
"technology of modern warfare calls for highly qualified and well trained troops."
(Fredland et al., eds., 1996) Haltiner (1997) concludes that the "Conscript Ratio"2 would
decrease with an increasing degree of technical complexity of applicants and armed
systems because conscripts serving on a short-term basis would no longer meet the
requirements regarding permanence in training and readiness for duty.
C. MILITARY MANPOWER OPTIONS
Problems of military manpower are as old as the military itself. (Haeckel, 1970)
Although no country has a military manpower system that is exactly the same as
another's, most military manpower schemes have some significant characteristics in
common. Almost all military manpower planners are faced with issues such as: the
numbers of soldiers needed, how to recruit them, how to keep them, how to train them,
how to control them, and how to make best use of them. Attempted solutions to these
problems are innumerable and infinitely diverse. For Haeckel (1970), there is only one
fundamental choice that bears on all possible alternatives: should military manpower rest
on the soldier's free will or on compulsion? Should soldiers be induced or coerced?
Should they be volunteers or conscripts? The difference between an All-Volunteer Force
(AVF) and a draft system is an fundamental one, and the decision to base a country's
2
Haltiner (1997) defines CR as the percentage of conscripts in the active armed forces.
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armed forces on one of these two principles or a combination of both entails a host of
problems and alternatives reaching far beyond the limited field of military recruitment
policy. (Haeckle, 1970)
The decision about which of the options defense planners should choose depends
on several variables, particularly the interests of society. The people of a nation have to
decide how much they are willing to "pay" in terms of personal freedom and budget for
their national security. Military and political leaders must, therefore, be sensitive to
current trends and be willing to perform needed changes very responsibly.
D. THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
The ability to create a vision and the willingness to implement changes are two of
the characteristics of successful leadership. In many senses, the task of a manager is to
influence behavior in a desired direction, usually toward the accomplishment of a specific
task or performance goal. To be effective managers need to understand the patterns of
behavior that are observed, to predict in what direction behavior will move, and to use
this knowledge to control behavior over the course of time. Organizational behavior, on
the other side, does not occur in a vacuum, but is significantly affected by its
environment. According to David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman (1991), organizations
have the characteristics of an open social system within a larger environment. That
environment provides opportunities for action, it provides constraints on activities, and it
makes demands upon organization's capacity.
3See David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational
Behavior," in Kolb, Rubin, and Osland, The Organizational Behavior Reader.
Any organization faces the environment with a given set of resources of various
kinds: people, technology, education, and so on. The process of determine how those
resources can best be used to achieve the desired output and to function within the
environment is mainly influenced by the vision and strategy of decision-makers. Beside
resource allocation, managers must specifically focus on how the organization must adapt









Source: David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational
Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The Organizational Behavior
Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 1.1. The Open-System Character of an Organization
E. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Can civilian management expertise and strategies be used to make the military
organization more competitive and efficient? Edward S. Quade (1989) and Charles L.
Schultze (1970) see significant differences between private and government
organizations in measuring performance and, therefore, the ability to predict future
outcomes. As Schultze states, government programs rarely have an automatic regulator
that tells us when an activity has ceased to be productive or can be made more efficient or
should be displaced by another activity. For a private organization, under competitive
market conditions, this regulator is given by the ability to satisfy the demands of its
customers cost effectively and is expressed in profit.4 Quade concludes that the
government should seek substitutes in the form of an appropriate analysis. He describes
policy analysis as "a form of applied research carried out to acquire a deeper
understanding of sociotechnical issues... searches for feasible courses of action, generate
information and marshaling evidence of the benefits and other consequences. . .that would
follow their implementations, in order to help policy-maker choose the most
advantageous action." (Quade, 1989, p. 48) Quade sees that the "heart of any decision
analysis is the existence or creation of a process that can predict or at least indicate the
consequences that follow the choice of an alternative" (Quade, 1989, p. 48). A model
can fulfill this function. He defines a "model" as a set of generalizations or assumptions
about the world; "a simplified image of reality that may be used to investigate the
outcome of an action without actually taking the action" (Quade, 1989, p. 48). Therefore,
if decision-makers consider a course of action for implementation, a scheme or process is
needed to tell what impacts would be generated and to what extent the objective would be
attained. In the policy question, for example, whether a nation should implement an AVF
or not, military policy makers should create a conceptual model that accounts for
important factors influencing the policy outcome (e.g., the success of the military
4
See Charles L. Schultz, "Statement in Planning, Programming, Budgeting," as cited in Quade, Analysisfor
Public Decisions.
system). Policy makers should also consider possible spillover effects and impacts on
stakeholders. Because the military organization also shows the character of an open
















Source: Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The
Organizational Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 1.2. The Conceptual Model of the Military Organization
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a conceptual model that shows the effects
of particularly economic variables and military design factors, on the successful
implementation of an all-volunteer force (AVF). Furthermore, by introducing the
"Institutional/ Occupational model," it demonstrates different approaches in
conceptualizing the military organization. A key issue in evaluating the whether a nation
should change its military system from a draft to an AVF is the question of how one
defines and measures the success of a military force under peacetime conditions. The
research is based mainly on the experience of all-volunteer recruitment in the United
States and Great Britain and recent trends elsewhere, especially in Western Europe.

II. THE CONCEPT OF LABOR DEMAND AND SUPPLY AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
Effective management of military personnel and, thus, the success of all-volunteer
recruitment require an understanding of a number of factors. These include the response
of personnel to pay and other policy tools, the optimal amount of training, the optimal
experience and quality mixes, and a proper mix of pay and other incentives. (Warner and
Asch, 1995)
This idea was the basic assumption of the President's Commission on an All-
Volunteer Armed Force, often referred to as the "Gates Commission." The Commission
viewed labor demand and supply under competitive market conditions as the basis for the
successful implementation of an AVF in the United States. Its 1970 recommendation to
end compulsory service was influenced mainly by a "market place philosophy." The
Commission concluded that military manpower requirements in an AVF could be
fulfilled only if the military could compete with private organizations for scarce labor
resources. Further, the Commission argued that recruiting and retaining an armed force
should rely primarily on monetary inducements guided by labor force realities. Needless
to say, this conclusion led to considerable controversy.
Cooper (1977) discusses the three major criticisms of the Gates Commission's
final report. The first, and probably most frequently voiced criticism, was that the
Commission focused almost solely on pay and economics, to the exclusion of other,
equally important, considerations. The second major criticism was that the Commission
tended to focus on the short-run problem of achieving an AVF at the expense of the
longer-run problems of sustaining and managing volunteer military manpower. 5
Finally, a third criticism was that the Commission would not consider the interests
of all stakeholders (i.e., attention to the issues concerning social representation) and the
spillover effects of this policy. Some scholars, such as Charles C. Moskos (1988), thus
saw the Gates Commission study as a "laissez-faire economic approach" and not as a
comprehensive policy analysis. He emphasizes that the issues of social acceptance and
integration are important factors that affect attitudes toward the military and the shape of
the military labor supply curve.
This chapter introduces a simple model of labor demand and supply that offers
some insights into labor market behaviors. These insights are very useful in
understanding the relationship between social, economic, military, and political factors in
the successful implementation of an AVF.
B. THE DEMAND FOR MILITARY LABOR
1. The Concept of the Demand for Labor
"The study of the labor market begins and ends with an analysis of the demand
for and supply of labor." (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, p. 35) On the demand side of the
labor market are employers, whose decisions about the hiring of labor are influenced by
5As Cooper observes: "Although the Commission did provide some guidance on these long-run issues, the
view that it tended to focus more on the problems of how to achieve a volunteer force and whether it could
be sustained, rather than how best to sustain it, is probably correct. Indeed, issues such as the mix of
manpower, training policies, career management, and compensation are all important to the future of the
volunteer force, yet were given only passing by the Commission" (Cooper, 1977, p. 108).
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conditions in different markets.6 Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) conclude that an
employer's "demand of labor" is a function of:
1
.
The characteristics of demand in the product market (i.e., elasticity 7);
2. The ease with which labor can be substituted for capital and other factors
of production; and
3 The price of labor itself, as well as the price of other factors of production.
For the purpose of making or evaluating manpower policies, the demand for labor
has two important characteristics. The first is that it can be shown theoretically—and
demonstrated empirically—that the labor demand curves slope downward. (Pindyck,
Rubinfeld, 1994) Cooper (1977) supports this theory. He states that the demand for
recruits is a downward-sloping function of the cost of first-term labor. As first-termers
become more expensive relative to other inputs to the defense mission, the military will
demand fewer first-termers and more of these other inputs. The second characteristic of
the demand for labor is that the quantity of labor demanded has varying degrees of
responsiveness to wage changes. This means that, while the quantity of labor demanded
always declines as the wage increases, this decline will be larger in some cases than in
others. Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) see the degree of responsiveness as crucial to most
policy issues.
6As Ehrenberg and Smith write: "The labor market is one of the three markets in which a firm must
successfully operate if they are to survive; the two other ones are the capital market and the product market.
The labor and capital markets are the major ones in which firms' inputs are purchased, and the product
market is the one in which output is sold." (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, p. 35).
'Elasticity is a measure of the sensitivity of one variable to another. Specifically, it is a number that
provides the percentage change that will occur in one variable in response to a one-percent change in
another variable. For example, the price elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of quantity
demanded to price changes. The demand is price elastic if a small change has a large effect on the quantity
demanded. The demand is price inelastic if the quantity demanded is less effected by changes in the price
level.
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2. Military Manpower Demand
Political as well as geostrategic circumstances significantly affect the demand for
national security and society's support for the military. Countries such as Germany,
France, and the Netherlands, historically surrounded by powerful "Great Powers," have
almost always required and depended on conscription to raise large and standing armies
to defend themselves. The population supported the military and was willing to share the
burden of national defense in terms of both monetary values and active participation. On
the other hand, insular states such as Britain and Australia have only rarely faced a threat
of invasion and, hence, have rarely needed to raise large armies to protect their frontiers
in peacetime.
Since the fall of the "Wall" in 1 990, this situation has changed. Because people
are less sensitive to security, they no longer see the need to maintain a relatively large
military; and they are less willing to share the burden of defense in the same way as
before. The demand for national security is now both lower and possibly more "elastic,"
which implies that society is more concerned about the "costs" of defense rather than the
"benefits" of military defense capability. This situation exerts a downward pressure on
the military budget. In manpower issues, defense planners are also more sensitive to the
cost of manpower in the labor market and are motivated to use technology and/or civilian
employees instead of the relatively more-expensive military personnel. Figure 2.1 shows
both, the shift from Dl to D2 and also the influence of the substitution as wages rise from
Wl to W2. results in a decreased demand for military personnel and, therefore, induces a
shift of the demand curve from (Dl) to (D2). This implies that the proportion of the
eligible manpower pool that is required to fill vacancies drops from Rl to R2. This shift
12
also implies that military defense planners are less willing to recruit military personnel at
every given wage level.
Wage
R2 Rl
Eligible Pool of Population
1.0
Figure 2.1. Shift of the Demand Curve for Military Personnel
Karl W. Haltiner (1997) supports this idea. He sees, after the demise of the
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the end of what he calls the "Mass Army" in Western
Europe. He bases his "Theory of the Decline of the Mass Army" on the assumption that
enormous economic productivity and the high living standards in industrialized modern
societies are considerably affected by an ever-increasing functional division of labor and
professional specialization. The armed forces of modern societies will, therefore, become
leaner in personnel in the future. According to Haltiner, "they rely on high technology
and are highly differentiated and complex as far as their organization and function are
concerned." (Haltiner, 1997, p. 2)
The demand for military personnel can, thus, be defined as a function of the force
structure (i.e., technology versus manpower), quality and productivity of soldiers, force
size (number of active units), and the attrition rate. The more high-tech weapons an
armed force has or the more productive soldiers become, the fewer personnel will be
13
demanded. Cooper (1977) also supports the negative relationship between productivity
(i.e., experience) and manpower demand. 9
The decision to implement an AVF is often closely related to the question of the
cost of military manpower. The price one has to pay for a unit of labor depends on
several factors, but is mainly determined by the quality and quantity the organization
demands.
The Gates Commission also recognized this issue and saw the size and quality of
the future military as the most critical variables in planning for an AVF. According to
the Commission, "small forces or those of low quality could be raised on a voluntary
basis, even if military compensation were reduced. Very large forces or those of high
quality would require substantial increase in military pay." (Gates Commission Report,
1970, p. 34)
This finding by the Gates Commission leads to the conclusion that even nations
with low military budgets would be able to create an AVF at least economically
successfully. But, these governments have to account for losses in effectiveness and
military capability. This may result in a decline of acceptance and credibility for the
military. The vision and strategy of defense planners are, therefore, essential before a
nation can consider a change from draft to volunteer manpower recruitment. They must
8
See Department of Social Sciences, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, United States Military
Academy, 1997, The Labor Marketfor Soldiers (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel).
9Cooper observed for the U.S. military that "career personnel can be substituted for first termers at a rate of
about four careerists for every ten first-termers... even taking into account the higher rates of pay, the
higher retirement cost, and the larger reenlistment bonuses that would be required to sustain a larger career
force, we find that the total enlisted force of about 1.6 million, split evenly between first-termers and
careerist, would provide the same overall force capability as the current 1.8 million member force with a
60/40 experience mix." (Cooper
,
1977, p. 3 1 1)
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make the trade-off between desired quality and capability of the military in the future and
the price they are willing to pay for it.
3. Short-Run Versus Long-Run Considerations
The "shape" of the demand curve is important for long-term considerations and is
partially determined by the vision and strategy of defense planners. The development
and implementation of technology is time intensive, which constrains the organization's
ability to substitute technology for labor in the short-run. Cooper (1977) notes that,
especially in the short-run, recruiting objectives may be relatively inflexible since, for a
given force structure, it may take considerable time to substantially alter the mix of inputs
for the defense mission. Cooper emphasizes the need to make the distinction between
"demand" and "requirements" for military manpower. He relates the demand to the long-
run relationship between the numbers of people desired and their costs. Manpower
requirements refer to the number of people desired at any point in time.
C. THE SUPPLY FOR MILITARY LABOR
1. The Concept of the Supply of Labor
The previous section looks at a simple model of behavior on the demand side of
the labor market. This section introduces the supply side of the market. As mentioned
above, the demand curve of labor is influenced mainly by an organization itself. Vision,
organizational structure, strategy, and the composition of resources in the production
process determine the desired quantity and quality of the labor force and the "price" an
organization is willing to pay for a marginal unit of labor.
On the supply side of the labor market are the workers or potential workers,
whose decision about where and whether to work must take into account their other
options for how to spend time. The labor supply curve shows the relationship between
15
wage and quantity of labor supplied, holding everything else constant. It is essential to
note that the term "labor supply" involves an individual's decision to join an
organization, as well as the decision to remain in the job.
Economists assume that, with an increase in wage rate, individuals are likely to
10
supply more labor. The supply curve of a particular market results from an individual's
willingness to provide labor for a specific occupation or organization and is a schedule of
reservation wages that indicates the labor forthcoming at each wage level. Reservation
rate can be defined as the lowest wage rate for which a person would work. The amount
by which one's wage exceeds one's reservation rate in a particular job is the amount of
his or her economic rent. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1 994) The existence of rents is the
result of differences in worker preferences, as discussed below.
Lo Ll
Figure 2.2. The Concept of Economic Rents
.
In addition to the size of the eligible cohort, the shape and slope of the labor
supply curve is influenced mainly by the attitude of workers toward a specific occupation
or organization. As a result, one would expect the supply of labor, with respect to pay, to
10 This positive relationship comes from the substitution effect: as the wage rate increases, the opportunity
cost of leisure increases, so individuals tend to substitute labor for leisure.
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be best described as a non-linear function. A linear relationship between wage rate and
labor quantity, holding everything else constant, would imply that an organization could
attract unlimited labor just by increasing its wage rate. In reality, regardless of the wage
offered, some individuals will decide not to join an organization for several reasons—a
point that is important in later considerations.
What does this theory imply for decision-makers? The slope and the shape of the
labor supply curve determines the "price" an organization has to pay to attract the desired
quality and quantity of employees. Figure 2.3 shows that the wage bill for an





Figure 2.3. The Costs of Labor
Therefore, one can conclude that the steeper the supply curve in a wage-quantity
labor market framework, holding everything else constant, the higher the costs for an
enterprise to fill its vacancies. The flatter the supply curve, holding everything else






Figure 2.4. Cost of Manpower Under Different Supply Curves
As Figure 2.4 shows, the organization in the left diagram faces a much steeper
labor supply curve than the organization in the right diagram. To be able to attract the
same number of employees, it has to pay higher wages, which results in higher labor
costs.
To be successful, decision-makers should have an idea about the shape and slope
of the labor supply curve that an organization is facing. Furthermore, one should
recognize that the shape and slope of labor supply is affected by different factors. All of
these variables are highly correlated with an individual's willingness to provide labor for
a specific occupation or organization. The key question managers face is how to
influence the effects of these variables in favor of the organization. In this context, how
can the military organization change a steep labor supply curve to one that is more flat, to
keep labor costs low?
The "price" for labor is also influenced by variables that cannot be influenced by
an organization itself. With the passage of time, for example, changes in the population
and labor force participation may affect the supply for labor as well. Similarly,
education, training, and skill-enhancing experience can improve the quality of the labor
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force and thereby expand the supply of human resources. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995)
Changes in any of these determinants of labor quantity cause a shift of the entire labor
supply curve in the long run.
2. The Concept of Occupational Choice
The concept of "occupational choice" is based on the assumption that workers in
the labor market would rather maximize their level of utility than they would their
income. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994) This concept implies that an employee's decision
about whether and where to work depends on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects
of a job. As Warner and Goldberg write: "In the labor market, non-pecuniary elements
are thought to play a large role in the determination of the equilibrium market wage rates
and the self-selection of individuals with dispersed tastes into various occupations."
(Warner and Goldberg, 1984, p. 1)
An organization, for example that offers employment in a dirty, noisy, and
dangerous environment, or has a bad reputation concerning treatment of its employees,
finds it hard to attract job applicants. Such an enterprise must pay a higher wage rate to
bring in the desired quality and quantity of labor. One can say that this organization
faces a steep or inelastic labor supply curve. It has to increase the wage rate significantly
to be able to increase the pool ofjob applicants. "The 'extra' wage an organization must
pay (i.e., in relation to the market wage rate) to attract workers is called compensation
wage differential. The higher wage is paid to compensate workers for the undesirable
working conditions." (Ehrenberg, Smith, 1994, p. 243)
In contrast, if an organization offers a clean and modern work environment and
has a good reputation in the community, individuals are more likely to want to work
there. This organization faces a more elastic labor supply curve. It can easily fill its
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vacancies with even a small increase in wages and select the best matching employees
from a pool of applicants.
In summary, one can conclude that the wage rate an organization must pay to
attract or to keep employees is influenced largely by the workers' attitude toward this
enterprise, holding everything else constant. Controlling for other social and economic
factors (e.g., unemployment rate, population base, wage offers of competitors), working
conditions, as well as the question of fairness and organizational justice, 11 determines
substantially an individual's decision to join or to stay in an organization.
Ehrenberg and Smith conclude that "compensation wage differentials become the
prices at which good working conditions can be purchased by, or bad ones sold to,
workers. Contrary to what is commonly asserted, a monetary value can often be attached
to events or conditions whose effects are primarily psychological in nature" (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 1994, p. 244). Therefore, compensating wage differentials provide the key to
the valuation of these nonpecuniary aspects of employment.
3. The Concept of Military Labor Supply
Nations considering a change from the draft to all-volunteer recruitment must
determine a strategy that will ensure the successful implementation and management of
an AVF. In contrast to countries with compulsory service, nations with an AVF must be
concerned with the supply curve in the labor market and must compete with private
organizations for quality employees. Since the implementation of the AVF in the U.S.,
the research community within the military has devoted much effort toward improving
personnel management in the areas of manpower accession and retention. In contrast to a
draft system, "the fundamental concept of an AVF is the exclusive reliance on volunteers
"Paul M. Muchinsky (1997) relates "organizational justice" to the fair treatment of people in organizations.
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to meet the demand for enlisted personnel. The reliance only on volunteers has resulted
in major changes in the recruitment and management of military personnel." 12 Since
military capability is a function of force strength, an AVF must be judged in term's of its
ability to sustain desired force strength objectives.
According to Cooper (1977), the keys to deciding whether or not to implement an
AVF are in the military's ability to attract enough new recruits to sustain force strength
objectives without the pressure of the draft, and in the quality of these new recruits.
Success or failure of an AVF is based on two pillars: first, the ability to attract young
men and women to join the service and, second, the ability to motivate experienced and
qualified soldiers to stay in their jobs.
a. The Framework of Occupational Choice and its Implication for
the Military
The decision to enlist or reenlist is conveniently described using standard
occupational choice theory. Under competitive or free labor market conditions,
individuals who decide whether to join or to stay in the military must compare the pay
and non-pecuniary benefits available in the whole market. As mentioned before, is the
individual's supply price simply his or her alternative civilian wage plus the monetized
value of his or her perception of the non-pecuniary aspects of military employment. 14
This framework is, in accordance with Cooper (1977) and Warner and Asch (1995),
based on three assumptions. First, an individual's military reservation wage is a function
12
See Gary R. Nelson, "The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees under the AVF," in Bowman et al.,
eds., The A VF after a Decade.
13See Sherwin Rosen, 1986, "The Handbook of Labor Economics," in Hartley and Sandler, Handbook of
Defense Economics.
l4The "economic cost of military labor" can therefore be seen as the opportunity cost for those individuals
employed in the military.
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of his or her civilian earning opportunities so that, holding everything else constant,
individuals with higher civilian wage potentials would be expected to have, on average, a
higher reservation wage. This implies that the military has to offer a higher wage rate to
attract more-highly-qualified personnel. Second, the relationship between military




those on the upper reaches of the supply curve are on average, likely to
judge the non-pecuniary aspects of military service in a less favorable
light than those on the lower portion on the supply curve. In particular,
those on the upper portion of the supply curve are likely to require a
positive premium to be induced to serve voluntarily. Conversely, some of
those on the lower end of the supply curve may actually be willing to take
less than their civilian wage offer because of their favorable evaluation of
these non-pecuniary aspects. 16 (Cooper, 1977, p. 70)
The latter leads to the conclusion that there are other important factors beside the "pay-
variable" that might have a significant influence on an individual's decision to join or to
stay in the military.
Thus, Cooper sees the importance of categorizing the factors that are
expected to influence an individual's decision to join or to stay in the military into several
major groups: "(1) the tangible aspects of military employment, (2) the dissemination of
information to potential recruits, (3) the employment and earnings conditions in the
civilian economy, and (4) the population base from which the military must draw its
recruits, and (5) individuals' 'tastes' for military service." (Cooper, 1977, p. 159)
lsCooper assumes that some individuals are more favorably disposed toward military service than others.
He concludes that the differences between an individual's civilian wage opportunity and his or her supply
price thus represents the monetized value of his or her relative preference for military service.
l6Cooper mentions in this context an unpublished survey by Robert Gay of the RAND Corporation. Gay
found that about 25 percent of all individuals joining the military reported that they had earned more in
their most recent job than they actually received upon joining the service.
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b. Tangible Aspects
"Tangible aspects" of military employment in this context include (beside
the military pay variable) the length of the initial enlistment tour, the opportunity to
obtain training (i.e., general training), and the enlistment options used to lure potential
recruits into the military. Warner and Asch (1995) emphasize the role of human capital
development in the initial enlistment decision. The authors state that individuals may
join because they want to acquire skills and general training that will be useful later.
Enlistment options can and do include the freedom to specify one or more
items (e.g., occupational assignment, type of training, assignment location, etc.) as a
condition for entering the military. And, as Cooper observes, "as the military offers more
options to potential recruits, more individuals will enlist, simply because more will find a
match between their own preferences and what the military has to offer." (Cooper 1977,
pp. 159-160)
c. Job Matching and Job Separation
According to Ehrenberg and Smith (1994), one of the major functions of
the labor market is to provide the signals and mechanism by which workers seeking to
maximize their utility can be matched to employers trying to maximize profits as one of
the major functions of the labor market. "Matching is a formidable task because workers
have varying skills and preferences and because employers offer jobs that differ in skill
content and working environment." (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, p. 242) They conclude
that job match and job satisfaction are highly correlated. Arnold and Feldman (1982),
Kalleberg (1977), and Freeman (1978) have interpreted job satisfaction as an endogenous
variable that directly or indirectly influences job separation. (Buddin, 1977) Therefore,
one can conclude that job match and job satisfaction have a significant effect on a
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soldier's motivation as well as on job performance, and, hence, on his or her decision to
remain in the service.
Several studies have tried to explain retention by the match between a
worker and his or her firm. These studies base their theory on the assumption that
individuals and firms enter employment contracts with imperfect information. Johnson
(1978) and Wilde (1979), for example, looked at an individual's choice to remain with a
firm through the use of a learning or experience model. This model proposes that each
job represents a unique set of characteristics, and the only way an individual can
determine the true value of a job is through experience. This theory would seem
particularly appropriate for the military, where the effects of family separation,
deployment, and life at sea or in the field can only be realized over time.
A second model related to job matching and job separation used by
Javonovic (1977), Martenson (1978), and Wilde (1979) is known as the "search model."
This model says that, when a worker accepts employment, he or she may be uncertain
about alternative job offers. As new information becomes available about alternative
employment opportunities, an individual will reevaluate his or her employment contract.
Job separation results if alternative employment offers greater total returns than does he
current job match.
In contrast, Buddin (1984) observes that various indicators of military job-
person match have no significant impact on behavior, especially on early attrition (i.e.,
during the first six months). According to Buddin, factors such as qualifying for the
desired kind ofjob, having pre-enlistment knowledge of the job qualifications, or getting
the preferred job do not alter the likelihood of early attrition after controlling for other
variables. The "differences between the determinants of early attrition and the civilian
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separation of young workers may reflect both institutional differences between the two




The U.S. experience with an AVF shows that no single area of manpower
systems is more directly or more immediately affected by the removal of the draft than
recruiting. This should be fairly obvious, since the removal of compulsory service
increases the numerical requirements for volunteers, given a stable force size. The
recruiter played a relatively passive role during the draft, acting primarily to regulate the
flow of enlisted accessions into the U.S. Armed Forces. This stands in contrast to the
activist role that the recruiter must take in a volunteer military in searching for new
enlistees. There is little need to explain the importance of recruitment. An organization
that fails to attract a sufficient number of new members faces extinction. Further, the
characteristics of new members allow or prevent an organization from reaching its goals.
General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (1993), therefore, highlights
the importance of recruiting to ensure the success of an AVF in the U.S.
Eitelberg (1993) states that one important lesson learned in the U.S.
experience with an AVF relates to the importance of adequate recruiting and advertising
resources. Dorn (1993) claims that recruiting resources are critical to the services' efforts
in reaching their annual accession rates. The Gates Commission (1970) also recognized
17One has to recognize, though, that military employment has some characteristics not common in the
civilian sector. The most obvious is that voluntary separation is not allowed. The enlistment contract is a
commitment for service until the end of an obligated term. Thus, all separations before the end of the term
are service-initiated. (Buddin, 1984)
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See Gordon R. Sullivan, "The Volunteer Force and the Burden of Peace," in Fredland et al., eds.,
Professionals on the Frontline.
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the importance of recruiting programs. The Commission's final report suggested that
"the armed services devote an increased proportion of their resources to recruiting." (The
Gates Commission Report, 1970, p. 83) While the commission did not call for a specific
increase in the recruiting effort, more recent studies have shown a strong positive
relationship between enlistment supply and production recruiters. 19
In accordance with Cooper (1977) an analysis of the recruiting function
must begin with the basic objective of recruiting activities. Recruiting activities, in
general, include recruiters in the field, mailings, advertising, and logistical support for the
recruiting establishment. "Recruiting activity may serve merely to inform potential
recruits of the employment opportunities in the military or may also serve to persuade
some to join." (Cooper, 1977, p. 160) But the objective of a recruiting system is not only
to attract potential recruits, it must also attract the desired number of qualified personnel.
According to Cooper (1977), the responsibilities of a recruiting system are to (1) attract
individuals to seek employment in the military, (2) classify enlistment applicants
according to aptitude for the military service, (3) select from among these applicants, and
(4) determine where the enlistees ought to be assigned in the military. These
considerations are essential for successful manpower management for several reasons.
First, larger recruiting efforts will be expected to yield more enlistments, an assumption
generally accepted by economists, sociologists and, military leaders. Second, clearly
defined recruiting objectives and goals are fundamental to target the "right" group of
people. Third, the latter increases the probability of a job-person match, job-match,
19
See Gary R. Nelson, "The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer Force,'
in Bowman et al., The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade.
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which leads to better motivation, and productivity. Finally, job-person match reduces
attrition and, therefore, the turnover costs.
Another area of recruitment addresses what is called the realistic job
preview (RJP). Muchinsky (1997) sees RJPs as an attempt to portray jobs realistically,
the opposite of slick advertising that overemphasizes the job's good points and ignores its
bad points. "The rationale is that one reason people quit their jobs is due to
disillusionment. They were initially led to believe the jobs were going to be highly
attractive, but over time reality set in, and the jobs were not so great after all."
(Muchinsky, 1997, pp. 150-151)
Several studies in the civilian sector, however, indicate that the correlation
between RJP and separation is, at best, modest. Research by Zaharia and Burmeister
(1981) and Reilly, Brown, Blood, and Malatesta (1981) suggest that RJP activities often
exercise no effect on job acceptance rates, employee commitment, or eventual turnover
rates.
Nevertheless, one has to recognize that an RJP can significantly affect the
credibility of an organization, especially for the military, where commitment and trust are
core values. Recruiting methods and fairness may influence the willingness, especially of
high-quality personnel, to join or to stay in an organization, which, in turn, affects the
shape of the supply curve and thus the price of labor. General Maxwell R. Thurman
(1996) sees the need to tell potential recruits what is expected of a soldier, "that basic
training is tough, but that they can make it if they work at it." According to Thurman,
"they will [then] be proud when they have done it." (Fredland et al., eds., 1996, p. 62)
In general, the tangible attributes of military employment and recruiting
efforts can be manipulated through policy directives and are both, as Figure 2.5 shows,
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parts of the military design factor component. There are, however, factors, such as
employment and earning conditions, as well as the population base that are truly
exogenous to military policy control. This situation means that military defense planners
can only recognize and react to trends rather than take the initiative.
e. Population Base
The variable, "population base," refers to the pool of people in a society
from which the military draws its new recruits. The factor includes two aspects that are
essential for the success of an AVF. The first aspect is the quantity issue. Eitelberg
(1996) states that "perhaps the greatest fear of defense officials centered on a factor
beyond their control: the projected 'demographic depression,' or declining population of
military age youth." (Fredland et al., eds., 1996, p. 68) Nelson (1983), however, does
not see the decline of the eligible pool (i.e., size of youth cohort) as nearly the threat for













Source:Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The Organizational
Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 2.5. Recruitment and Tangible Aspects as Parts of Military Design
Factors
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The second aspect of the "population base" factor is the quality issue.
Quality in this context refers to the average educational background and technical
knowledge of a population. Some analysts have described the population base as the
"Qualified-Military-Available" or QMA pool of potential recruits. This takes into
account not only the new number of young people, but also the military's basic
qualifications for enlistment eligibility. It also eliminates persons (the "unavailable")
who are either institutionalized or firmly attracted to attend college over military
enlistment. In recent years, the QMA estimate of the military's population base has been
expanded to include an "I" or interest factor. The "QMA&I" estimate incorporates data
from surveys on the propensity, or professed levels of interest, among military-age youth
in joining the military.
In his framework to explain a soldier's proficiency, Steven Leveen (1983)
assumes that there are two qualities of a fighting force that combine to describe the
ability of that force to derive the full capabilities of its weapon systems. He calls the first
of these terms motivation, which relates to "the qualities of a force that make its
personnel appear enthusiastic rather than lackadaisical or dispirited." (Leveen, 1983, p.
3-3) The second term is called technological capacity, and refers to the capacity to
understand and operate the sophisticated equipment associated with modern warfare.
Leveen emphasizes the importance of what he calls the "Tractor Factor" and the "Atari
Factor." These terms capture, in his framework, the familiarity individuals acquire from
routine exposure to technology in their societies prior to joining the military. His model,
to assess personnel potential, is based on the assumption that the kind of experience and
familiarity gained through working on and operating mechanical equipment, such as
29
tractors, forms a part of the technological exposure helpful to military performance.
Leveen writes: "one instructor of aircraft mechanics from around the world reports that
there is a noticeable difference in aptitude between students from countries having
tractors and students from countries where tractors are uncommon." (Leveen, 1983, p. 2-
2) He sees the importance, especially in modern societies, in the exposure to electronic
and microelectronic equipment, including the associated keyboards, displays, and special
terminology. According to Leveen, "what may be gained from such exposure is not
necessarily a technician's ability to repair the equipment, but merely the familiarity of an
operator of such equipment." (Leveen, 1983, p. 2-2)
Therefore, the successful implementation of an AVF is based on a realistic
analysis of the "intellectual capability" of society. The assumption is that the higher the
average level of education and technical knowledge in a society, the greater is the pool
of eligible individuals and thus the easier and less expensive it is for the military to attract
high-quality personnel. The variables "average education" and "technical knowledge"
are supposed to have a positive and significant effect on the successful implementation of
an AVF.
Defense planners are facing the trade-off between their vision about
structure and ability of the force and the substance of human resources available. To
obtain the same level of technological sophistication among its recruits, a country with an
agricultural background would have to pay a higher price for its volunteers than would
more-modern nations. Figure 2.6 shows that the population base is one of the most
20
Education in this context means general training (e.g., reading and mathematics).
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important resources of the military organization, particularly under all-voluntary
recruitment conditions.
Another issue is the effect of educational benefits provided by the military
on the military labor supply. Moskos (1994) points out that military life is valued not
only for its own sake, but also because it is seen as a way to acquire in-service job
training and post-service educational benefits. Thus, it can be expected that, in
countries where tuition is low or almost free (i.e., Germany), the marginal effect of














Source:Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The Organizational
Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 2.6. Population Base as an Important Resource for the AVF
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See Charles Moskos, "Recruitment and Society after the Cold War," in Eitelberg and Mehay, eds.,
Marching Toward the 21s' Century.
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/ Taste
The last factor is the individual's "taste" for the military, which is closely
related to the concept of "occupational choice" mentioned earlier. Although this
framework provides a starting point for thinking about initial enlistment supply, it must
be expanded to explain enlistment behavior more fully.
Military manpower planners in the U.S. and Britain observed an
interesting phenomenon. In their societies, and they suspected in every one, a small
group of men, by their very natures, welcome the rigorous discipline, deprivation, and
danger of the military: and these men will elect that life regardless of the economic
rewards. The British labeled these men as the "French Foreign Legion hard core." (Tarr,
1981) They noted, too, that their societies also include people who will accept military
life if it offers them a combination of economic rewards, security, variety, adventure,
training, and many other attractions that young people seek. These people will be
influenced considerably by financial incentives.
Beyond these groups, according to the British, you will attract few people
regardless of the incentives you offer. Where the line might be drawn they
could only guess. But clearly, many with whom we talked so intently
believed that they had nearly reached the line by recruiting 1.3 percent of
the available pool. (Tarr, 1981, p. 127)
The fact that some people prefer the content and structure of military
employment, while others do not, supports the theory of a nonlinear relationship between
financial incentives and military labor supply. The assumption is that one's "taste" for
the military is the main influence on the shape of this curve.
Figure 2.7 shows the expected effects of wage on military labor supply.
The supply curve in this situation is more elastic on the lower portion. This implies that
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the military can increase the pool of applicants from "Rl" to "R2" by increasing the wage
rate from "Wl" to "W2" because individuals are attracted to the military profession. The
upper portion of the supply curve, in contrast, is more inelastic, which implies that people
are less willing to support the armed forces with labor and that the military has to
increase its wage significantly to be able to attract more applicants.
Wage
W4
Rl R2 R3 R4
Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
1.0
Figure 2.7. The Effect of "Taste" on Military Labor Supply
These findings refute the Gates Commission's conclusion that the military
could attract more people by offering more money. It shows that, especially in the long
run, financial rewards have limited attractiveness to certain individuals and that the
"taste" factor is important.
The key issue manpower planners face in the long run is how they can
influence the factors that determine the shape of the supply curve to make it more
responsive. The military manpower community, therefore, recognized the importance of
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tracking youths' attitudes and propensities toward the military, and then using this
99
information in recruiting programs.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
A successful implementation of an AVF starts with a clear definition of the task
and the future requirements of the armed force. It evokes the question about what and
how many resources should be used to achieve these goals. The importance of the
manpower factor in the conceptual model of military success has been expressed in a
number of ways. As Les Aspin, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, observed:
The key element of maintaining forces ready to fight is to maintain the
quality of our people, so that they remain the best fighting force in the
world. This means keeping our personnel highly motivated by treating
them fairly and maintaining their quality of life. It also means continuing
to recruit talented young men and women, expanding career opportunities
for all service members, and putting in place programs to ease the
transition to civilian life for departing military personnel as we bring down
the size of our forces. (Fredland et al., eds., 1996, p. 23)
All armed forces are faced with the same dilemma: to get the best possible men
and women, and to get them in sufficient numbers. High-quality personnel are, by
definition, in high demand and in short supply, and manpower planners therefore have to
compromise with regard to either the quality or the quantity of recruits, or both.
Typically, where such adjustments are necessary, all-volunteer forces tend to sacrifice
quantity; compulsory military forces, on the other hand, tend to sacrifice quality.
(Cooper, 1977,Haeckler, 1970)
22 See Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years," in Fredland et al., eds.,
Professionals on the Frontline.
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Successful defense management under all-volunteer conditions needs an under-
standing of a number of questions, including the responsiveness of personnel supply to
pay and other policy tools, the optimal amount of training, the optimal experience and
quality mix, and the proper mix of pay and other incentives.23
For Marcus and Quester (1984), the main problem of the military labor market is
not on the supply side: "The side of the market that we do not understand is the demand
side." (Marcus and Quester, 1984, p. 2) They see the importance of knowing what kind
of personnel are most productive and how different force configurations enhance or
reduce military effectiveness. Eitelberg (1993) and Cooper (1977) call it the "mix" of the
force. The difficulty in determining the "optimal mix" arises from the fact, as mentioned
above, that there is no tangible measurement of military output.
Meeting both quality and quantity requirements for military human resources is
the most critical factor for an AVF. The desired level of effectiveness, technology, and
capability of the military service sets the quality and quantity of manpower needed.
According to Bonnardot, "this need is combined with the price the nation accepts to 'pay'
for its security, constraints on individual freedom and finances." (Gerard Bonnardot,
1997, p.3)
Marcus and Quester (1984) state that, although research is able to estimate with at
least some accuracy the decision of an individual to join or to remain in the military,
there are still factors that have not been quantified. The supply of volunteers is,
according to Moskos (1988), Cooper (1977), and Dorn (1993), a function of many
23
See John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, "The Economics of Military Manpower," in Hartley and Sandler,
Handbook ofDefense Economics.
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factors, such as patriotism, the popularity of the military, and pecuniary as well as
nonpecuniary aspects of military service. Although these factors and their importance
vary substantially across countries, two of them are likely to be more important in almost
all countries: (1) the number of volunteers required and (2) the availability of attractive
civilian job offers. (Cooper, 1977)
The determinants of military labor supply must be separated into two types: first,
those the military can influence (monetary compensation, non-monetary compensation,
propensity to enlist, and quality) and second, those the service cannot influence
(unemployment, cohort size, and civilian compensation levels). 24
When considering military labor supply, one can conclude that the "price" the
military has to pay to recruit or to retain the desired quantity and quality of soldiers is
affected by several factors. In addition to variables that induce a shift of the curve (e.g.,
population base, unemployment rate, etc.), a society's attitude toward the military largely
determines the slope and shape of the curve.
Thus, the supply of military personnel can, according to Cooper (1977), be
defined in an equation as follows:
MLS = (W/C, R, U, P, T),
where, MLS = Military Labor Supply
W/C = Military / Civilian Pay Ratio
R = Recruiting Efforts
U = Unemployment Rate
24
See Department of Social Science, 1997, The Labor Marketfor Soldiers.
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P = Population Base
T = Taste for Military Service
As previously noted, the success of an AVF depends mainly on its ability to
attract the desired quantity and quality of personnel. This will be achieved at the point
where the demand or the expectations can be satisfied. Success of an AVF is, thus,
established when the military labor market is in its equilibrium, or, as shown in Figure
2.8, where the labor supply curve intersects the demand for military personnel.
Wage
R* 1.0
Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
Figure 2.8. The Market Equilibrium
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III. INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS OCCUPATIONAL APPROACH IN
CONCEPTUALIZING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II introduced a basic model of military labor demand and supply and the
problem that defense planners face in achieving a state of equilibrium. The model shows
that a successful AVF can be achieved at the point where the demand for military labor
equals its supply, or stated differently, where all vacancies can be filled with the optimal
mix of quality personnel. The previous chapter emphasizes the goal that defense planners
find the "right strategy" for reacting to different market forces.
This chapter looks at the success of a military system from a slightly different
point of view. In evaluating the decision to change a military system (e.g., from a draft
system to one with all-volunteer recruitment), policy makers have to consider the
structure, concept, and culture of the "new" military and its effects on important
stakeholders. This chapter explores the "institutional/occupational" or "I/O" model,
developed by Charles Moskos, and its implications for the armed forces, with special
emphasis on the civil-military relationship and combat motivation of soldiers. As Figure
3.1 shows, the vision and strategy of defense-planners can influence the concept of the
military organization.
The I/O thesis was first proposed in 1977, at a time when the U.S. military was
undergoing serious crises. As Eitelberg (1996) observes, it was the time when "recruiters
missed their goals; personnel attrition seemed uncontrollable; troop morale waned along



















Source: Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The Organizational
Behavior Reader. [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 3.1. The Concept of the Military Organization:
Institutional or Occupational?
and standard performance circulated widely." (Fredland et al., eds., 1996, p. 67) Moskos
(1988) ties the causes of the so-called "hollow force" of the late 1970s to the Gates
Commission Report (1970), which established a free-market approach and overlooked
many important spillover effects of AVF policies. Since the end of the draft, the U.S
military has been steadily been moving away from the institutional format to one that is
occupational. (Moskos and Wood, eds., 1988) The econometric approach of military
manpower also failed, in his view, because of its inability to anticipate second-or third-
order outcomes of a marketplace AVF 25
25 See Charles Moskos, "The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force," in Bowman et al., eds., The All-Volunteer
Force After a Decade.
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Moskos' I/O thesis gained attention not only from social researchers on military
organization, but also from a number of senior commanders in the armed forces.
Although the following discussion draws heavily on the American experience, the
essential differences between institutional/occupational models of military organization
are expressed in terms suitable to cross-national research.
B. THE OCCUPATIONAL VERSUS THE INSTITUTIONAL MODEL
Armed forces are complex organizations. Given their size and internal diversity,
they obviously share many features with civilian organizations of comparable
complexity. (Kurt Lang, 1972) Budget constraints and the need for more efficient and
effective use of scarce resources raises a fundamental policy question about the structure
and concept of military service in the future. These issues are significant, especially for
nations that consider a change from compulsory military service to an AVF. Two
questions are key to the discussions between sociologists and economists, or as
Fleckenstein (1988) states, between traditionalists and reformers: Should an all-volunteer
military rely on the expertise and management styles of civilian enterprises? And, how
would such a policy affect military capability and the relationship between the armed
forces and society? The answer to these questions is still under debate.
From the earliest days of the AVF in the United States, two basic concepts have
dominated the discussion about the role and concept of the military organization. These
models are called the "occupational" and "institutional" approaches. Even though these
terms have descriptive limitations, they do contain core connections that serve to
distinguish each from the other. (Moskos, 1988)
41
1. The Occupational Approach
The occupational model is based on the assumption that each individual tries to
maximize his or her level of utility where utility depends importantly on money income
and job satisfaction. In the post-industrial age, quality of life, as well as personal
freedom and individualism, are getting more important, especially for the younger
generations in modern societies. Defense planners are facing the problem of how to
motivate this group of young men and women to join the military, where they have to
relinquish personal control to the government over the following: exposure to the risk of
combat; relocation of themselves and/or their families; work requirements on holiday,
weekends, and overtime; family separation; and exposure to conditions and hazards of
field duty. (5
th QRMC, 1984, p. 1-5) Clearly, this issue is much more important for
nations that base their military manpower procurement on volunteer recruitment than for
those that rely on compulsory military service.
Advocates of the occupational approach claim that, to ensure successful defense
management, the "modern" military (e.g., AVF) must be able to compete with other
organizations for scare resources (e.g., quality personnel) in the marketplace. They see
the need for structural and ideological changes in the military organization and
recommend using the expertise and management strategies of private organizations.
Warner (1984), therefore, suggests that military manpower planners should base their
decisions mainly on the supply and demand framework, rather than on normative
considerations. He identifies four distinguishing characteristics of the occupational
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approach: efficiency, response to incentives, consumer preferences, and current value of
compensation.
The AVF experience in the United States provides one good example of the
occupational approach in conceptualizing the military. The Gates Commission (1970)
addressed the problem of how to make a successful change from a draft system to one
that relies solely on volunteer recruitment. The Commission's findings were based on the
core assumption that all-volunteer recruitment would work only if military manpower
planners react appropriately to changing market situations; that monetary and
nonpecuniary incentives could make a difference in military enlistment and retention
rates. The commission believed that the fundamental goal of the compensation system
should be to obtain the correct mix of personnel at the lowest possible cost. This is one
reason that, since the implementation of the AVF in the U.S. in 1973, the military has
relied primarily upon the competitive labor market to obtain personnel. Moskos (1988)
sees the occupational model legitimized only in terms of the marketplace. He concludes
that the occupational military is anchored mainly in marketplace principles and is based
on the following set of core assumptions:
(1) No analytical distinctions exists between the military and other
systems, in particular, no differences between cost-effectiveness analysis
of civilian enterprises and military services; (2) military compensation
should as much as possible be in cash, rather than in kind or deferred,
thereby allowing for a more efficient operation of the marketplace; and (3)
military compensation should be linked directly to skill differences of
individual service members. (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p. 17)
26 See John Warner, "Issues in Evaluating Military Compensation Alternatives", as cited in Harris, Military
Compensation and the All-Volunteer Force.
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2. The Institutional Approach
On the other side those are who argue that, because of the "uniqueness of the
military" and the concept of the citizen soldier, the occupational approach would lead to
a decline of acceptance of the armed forces in society and, furthermore, would hurt
military readiness. Proponents of this approach claim that the military can be effective
only if all of its members subordinate their personal desires to the greater purpose of the
military organization. They state that the unique conditions and demands of military
service require servicemembers with special characteristics. As a 1982 task force
observes:
Military members, beyond having the physical and mental abilities
required for their jobs, must have a special measure of dedication and
loyalty to their comrades in arms and their military organization. These
qualities must be underlaid with a love of their country and its ideals.
(Military Manpower Task Force, 1982, p. xvi)
The institutional approach differentiates between the functions of military and
civilian occupations and uses the specific characteristics of the military vocation as
guiding principles. Karl Lang defines an institution as a "place of residence and work
where a larger number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed and formally administered life"
(Lang, 1972, p. 55) The institutional concept hinges on the idea that members of an
institution are motivated primarily by a sense of identity with the organization. Their
27
Uniqueness of the military service exists because members of the armed forces are legally liable to
armed combat. The risks of death or injury, as well as other limitations, require a special blend of
commitment and dedication on the part of the individuals who serve in the armed service. (5 th QRMC,
1984, p. 1-5)
28
See Bernhard Fleckenstein, "The Federal Republic of Germany," in Moskos and Wood, eds., The
Military.
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commitment is grounded on values of "duty," "honor," and "country," and on the belief
that military service is a "way of life" and not a "job." German traditionalists of the
military vocation express the special commitment and responsibility of soldiers in the
phrase, "Soldatsein ist kein Beruf, sondern eine Berufung," which means "To be a soldier
is not a job; it is a calling." The institutional approach assumes that "the armed forces are
not merely fluid collections of self-maximizing individuals, but sets of social relations
and institutional arrangements as well." (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p. 4) Military forces
require certain behaviors from their members that can, in accordance with Moskos and
Wood (1988), never be made to serve individuals' interests, particularly not in a narrow
economic sense. It is, therefore, the philosophical question about why and for what
reasons do soldiers risk their life and health? Or, what is the "price" of a human being?
Consequently, it is not surprising that a soldier's motivation in combat has been
interpreted in many ways throughout history. Moskos (1988) and Lang (1972) summarize
the different viewpoints of combat motivation. One interpretation finds combat
motivation resting on the presumed national character of the general populace; another
sees it is a result of effective military leadership, discipline, and unit esprit de corps . Still
others believe that the effective soldier is motivated either by a sense of national
patriotism or by a belief that he or she is fighting for a just cause. His or her combat
performance, thus, depends "upon commitment to abstract values or symbols of the larger
society." (Moskos, 1988, p. 3) Moskos, therefore, sees an institution, in contrast to an
occupation, legitimated in terms of values and norms. The conditions under which
29
See 5
th QRMC, 1984, p. 1-3, cited in Harris, 1994, Military Compensation and the All-Volunteer Force:
Lessons Learned.
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people live and work develop the sense of identity that binds them together. Cotton
(1988) points out that the traditional perception of the military service is a calling, or
vocation, to the nation by its citizens, legitimated by broadly-based national values. 30
"Members of an institution [e.g., the military]... are commonly viewed and regard
themselves as being different or apart from the broader society." (Moskos and Woods,
1988, p. 16) Supporters of the institutional approach emphasize that members of the
armed forces should feel this separation and their special commitment with the
community. Therefore, instead of being paid entirely in market-driven monetary wages,
they should serve for the institutional benefits of respect and for other social advantages.
(Harris, 1994)
Table 3.1 summarizes the conceptual differences between the institutional and
occupational approach.
C. INSTITUTIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL TRENDS IN MILITARY
SERVICES
Although the military must maintain its autonomy, it also needs support and
integration in society, especially in democratic nations. The decision to implement an
AVF is closely related to the vision about the role of the military in the community and
its relationship to society. On one hand, a military system (e.g., an AVF) is seen as
successful and affordable only if it finds credibility, support, and acceptance in the
nation. On the other hand, military organizations are also appraised for their ability to
manage scarce resources effectively and efficiently. Because of the duality of autonomy
30
See Charles A. Cotton, "The Institutional Organization Model and the Military," in Moskos and Wood,
eds., The Military.
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Table 3.1. Military Social Organization: Institutional vs. Occupational
Variable Institutional Occupational
Legitimacy Normative values Marketplace economy
Societal regard Esteem based on notions of service Prestige based on level of
compensation
Role commitments Diffuse; generalist Specific, specialist
Reference groups "Vertical" within the armed forces "Horizontal" with
occupations
Recruitment appeals Character qualities; life-style High recruit pay; technical
orientation training
Evaluation of Holistic and qualitative Segmented and quantitative
performance
Basis of compensation Rank and seniority; decompressed Skill level and manpower
by rank shortages; compressed by
rank
Mode of Much in noncash form or deferred Salary and bonuses
compensation
Legal system Military justice; broad purview Civilian jurisprudence;
over members limited purview over
members
Female roles Limited employment; restricted Wide employment; open
career pattern career pattern
Post-service status Veterans' benefits and preferences Same as nonserver
Source: Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces'^ in Charles C.
Moskos and Frank R. Wood. The Military: More Then Just a Job. (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense Publisher, 1988), p. 16.
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versus the need of recognizing societal trends, two alternative conceptions of the military
have dominated the discussion about the conceptions of the AVF in the United States.
(Moskos and Wood, eds., 1988) The major concerns of Moskos' I/O model are the social
legitimacy of the military within the society and, as Cohen states, "the cohesion and
operational commitment within the military community." (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p.
44) Cotton (1988) supports this theory. He emphasizes the open character of the military
system because of an interactive and interdependent relationship between the military and
society. As Cotton writes: "The I/O model focuses our attention on the ways in which
the military service and organization are defined socially, both inside and outside the
defense community." (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p. 42)
Moskos (1988), furthermore, states that the I/O concept contains an implicit
understanding of motivation. And he asks: "is motivation rational or subjective,
oriented toward moral concerns of altruism, strongly affected, perhaps, by internal
emotional concerns, or is it efficient and rational, concerned primarily with objective
calculations?" (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p. 25) The I/O theory raises the question of
why people decide to join the military. Do individuals join the military because they see
service in the armed forces as a kind of duty and responsibility to the nation? Or, do
people join because they are attracted only by financial incentives and job security? It
would be injustice to reality to consider these questions only in their extreme form.
Individuals also join the military because they are attracted by the financial incentives as
well as by their feelings of responsibility for their nation. Moskos points out that the
pure form of the institutional and occupational concept does not exist in reality. He
31 See Charles A. Cohen, "The Institutional Organization Model and the Military," in Moskos and Wood,
eds., The Military.
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emphasizes that " both elements have been and always will be present in the military
system." (Moskos and Woods, 1988, p. 15)
The discussion about rearmament in Germany and the debate about the structure
of the Bundeswehr and its role in the society provide a different evaluation of the effects
of the occupational concept of the civil-military relationship. The conceptualization of
the military is, according to Bernhard Fleckenstein (1988), closely related to a country's
historical experience with the military and the soldiers' perception of themselves in
society. Fleckenstein asks: "Do soldiers claim a special role for themselves... or are they
willing to enter into a close association with the civilian population?" (Moskos and
Woods, 1988, p. 178) In Germany, the discussion of the military vocation is especially
problematic because of the country's history. Therefore, the discussion about the concept
of the Bundeswehr was and still is more focused on the effects of the military profession
self-image than on the relationship between the military and society. It was the declared
will of lawmakers in Germany to integrate the Bundeswehr as much as possible into the
industrially-developed and democratically- constituted society, to prevent military life,
according to Fleckenstein, from "developing again independently of its society, and to
prevent the new military from becoming once again a 'state in the state'." (Moskos and
Woods, 1988, p. 188) The founders of the Bundeswehr were, in Fleckenstein' s view,
clearly influenced by the idea of the occupational military. He notes that the concept of
Innere Fuehrung, which laid the basis for the Bundeswehr, is aimed toward the
intellectual, political, and moral reform of the armed forces in the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). Reformers such as Count von Baudissin believed that the only way to
fully integrate the Bundeswehr into society was to equate military and civilian work.
Their concept was based on the idea that the soldier's job should no longer be considered
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as a job "sui generis," but as an occupation like any other. The military was conceived as
an "institution of the public services"; the military profession was viewed as a profession
like any other; the working conditions and duty requirements of the soldiers were to be
made as similar as possible to the conditions of civilian employment and especially
similar to those of the civil service. In a 1970 White Paper, the German Ministry of
Defense attempted to describe the "new soldier of the Bundeswehr." In a clear trend
toward occupationalism, soldiers were regarded as employees, just like policemen,
firemen, workers on an assembly line, or technicians. 32 This resulted in the right of a
soldier to join professional organizations and unions as well as the general right to work
for his or her goals.
Baudissin and his colleagues were confronted with serious criticism. Their
opponents, such as Heinz Karst, Winfried Martini, and Friedrich Dopner, demanded a
retreat from the Baudissin' s concept, which, in their opinion, had proven ineffective and
inapplicable.
On the ideological level, the discussion between the reformists and traditionalists
about a vocational model for the Bundeswehr continues today. However, the reformers'
ideas were largely realized in the military legislation, and, in Fleckenstein's view, the
Bundeswehr became the prototype for occupational military. Fleckenstein writes:
"Nevertheless, historical experience and ingrained personal traits cannot simply be
supplanted by other concepts; the inertia of traditional concepts concerning soldiers and
32 See White Paper, 1970, The Security ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany and the Situation ofthe Armed
Forces, cited in Fleckenstein, "The Federal Republic of Germany."
For example, the German Armed Forces Association - DBwV: Deutscher Bundeswehr Verband e. V., or
the Union for Public Utilities and Transportation - OTV: Gewerkschaft Offentlicher Dienst, Transport und
Verkehr.
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the military life have always been strong, and they are so now." (Moskos and Wood,
eds., 1988, p. 181)
The current discussion, however, has lost much of the fervor of the debates in the
1960s and 1970s. In addition to the traditional and reformists orientations, a third
approach has emerged, the so-called pragmatic. The national discussion on the military
vocation of the Bundeswehr can be clarified schematically, as shown in Table 3.2., by
applying these three approaches.
According to Fleckenstein (1988), on the ideological level and according to the
official version, the debate continues between traditionalists and reformists concerning a
vocational model for the military. He states: "In daily practice, however, the pragmatic
approach has come to dominate; this approach is synthetic result of the ambivalence
present in the discussion in the Federal Republic [of Germany], which could be found
even in time of German rearmament. (Moskos and Wood, eds., 1988, p. 180)
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The occupational and institutional approaches clarify important issues that may
have a crucial effect on the success of an AVF, most notably the relationship between the
armed forces and society. The discussion above shows that both concepts differ in their
values, which may influence the culture in the military organization significantly.
Moskos' I/O thesis can been seen as an attempt to conceptualize the effects of military
policies both on military effectiveness and on the relationship between the armed forces
and society. Therefore, advocates of the institutional approach need to realize, as





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































correlation between the effectiveness of the military organization with its values and
culture, and society's attitude toward that organization.
Fleckenstein (1988) mentions the importance of considering a nation's historical
experience with the military. By using the example of the Bundeswehr in the Federal
Republic of Germany, he shows that the military self-image and the relationship between
the armed forces and society can be as important as military effectiveness itself. How
will an AVF be seen in the nation? Will people still accept it as an integral and important
part of the community? Do they fear that removal of the draft would threaten normal
methods of civilian or democratic control over the military? Or will the military lose
credibility after the change from a draft to an AVF because of the belief that "economic
soldiers," as Machiavelli states,
will never be stand firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious. . . . [They
have] no fear of god and keep no faith with men.... [T]hey have no love
or other motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is
not enough to make them ready to die for you. (Machiavelli, 1513, p. 55)?
Defense planners have to consider these facts and must, therefore, be sensitive
about the image of the military in society.
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IV. THE SUCCESS OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
A. INTRODUCTION
A nation raises and maintains military forces for two primary purposes: to deter
others from employing military forces against it and to conduct military operations if
deterrence should fail. Melvin R. Laird (1980 b) sees part of the problem of analyzing
the state of military preparedness as a schematic; it is attributable to confusion in terms.
Laird writes:
Some people who discuss the issue talk about the capabilities of our [U.S.]
armed forces to achieve certain objectives. Others talk about the readiness
of our [U.S.] forces to undertake certain mission. Still others use capability
and readiness interchangeably. In fact, capability and readiness are not the
same. Capability is the more inclusive concept. Readiness, on the other
hand, is a component of capability. But both are important. (Laird, 1980 b,
p. 2)
It is difficult to develop a conceptual model that explains the effectiveness and
efficiency of a military system because it is not easy to find reliable measurements of
military output in peacetime. Moskos (1986) claims that the success of a military system
should not be explained solely on the basis of economic considerations, because this
approach omits many other important variables that affect the system. 34 This under-
standing is important, particularly if a major reorganization or restructuring of a military
system is intended. The goals and objectives of a change involve questions about what
one wants to achieve and how one can achieve it. The answers to these questions are
crucial to any policy analysis process. For example, if a nation is considering a change in
its military system, an evaluation of its decision should start with a definition of the
34
See Charles C. Moskos, "The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique," in Bowman et al., The All-
Volunteer Force After a Decade.
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intended outcome of this policy. "To find out how effective the various means or
alternatives are in achieving those objectives, it is necessary to determine a way to
measure their effectiveness." (Quade, 1989, p. 53)
As Figure 4.1 shows, this chapter introduces the "dependent variable" of the
conceptual model. The dependent variable is called "The Success of an AVF" The
chapter also discusses the difficulties in determining and evaluating successful defense
management, especially under peacetime conditions, and suggests methods that might be















Source: Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The
Organizational Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 4.1. The Success of an All-Volunteer Force
B. THE ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO EVALUATING SUCCESSFUL
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
Many policy analysts agree that making defense management analytically
tractable is the main challenge of defense planners. (Bowman, et al., eds., 1986).
56
Because it is difficult to find quantitatively reliable measures for the effect of political
and social factors on military output, the question of "how much defense?" is regarded
mainly as an economic problem. Broadly stated, the policy problem facing defense
planners is one of selecting the appropriate amount of defense at the least possible cost.
Hitch and McKean (1963) describe it as follows:
The problem of national security might in theory be regarded as one big
economic problem. The nation has certain resources—now and
prospectively in the future—which are conventionally classified be
economists as various sorts of land, labor, and capital. These resources
can be used to satisfy many objectives of the nation and its individual
citizens—national security, a high standard of living, social security, a
rapid rate of economic growth, and so on. These are, of course, competing
objectives. In general, the more resources the nation devotes to national
security, the less it will have for social security and vice versa. We could
(as some economists have done) conceive of a "social welfare function"
which we would attempt to maximize by appropriate allocation of the
nation's resources among the various activities satisfying these objectives.
(Cooper, 1970, p. 6)
In October 1 997, the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society was held. A representative of the French Ministry
of Defense, Gerard Bonnardo (1997), stated that the organizational format of a recruiting
system for the armed forces—conscription or AVF—is a synthesis and a compromise
between defense requirements stemming from an external geostrategic situation and the
domestic price a nation is willing to pay in terms of individual freedom and budget for its
security at a particular moment. Eitelberg (1993) also sees that an increase in defense
spending comes, to some extent, at the expense of social programs, and an emphasis on
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social programs conversely results in less for defense. 35 This decision determines, to a
large extent, the size, structure, and type of military systems.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
Although econometric approaches can provide valuable insights in assessing
many defense issues, they are also impractical in some ways because they do not provide
defense planners with the opportunity to analyze the effectiveness of defense
management. As Hitch and McKean (1963) write:
In fact for reasons which will become familiar as we proceed but are in
any event obvious, this kind of approach to the problem of national
security is completely impractical and sterile. We have to break economic
problems, like so many others, into manageable pieces before we can
make a good beginning at finding solutions. And in fact, in the United
States and all other countries, governments, and departments of defense
are organized to deal with appropriate parts of the grand problem at many
different levels.
As a beginning let us consider economic problems at each of three rather
gross levels. National security, from the point of view of an economist,
may be said to depend on three things: (1) the quantity of national
resources available; (2) the proportion of these resources allocated to
national security purpose; and (3) efficiency with which the resources so
allocated are used. (Cooper, 1977, p. 6)
The economic approach is analytically attractive because it enables the policy
analyst to sidestep the critical issue of "how much defense?" and instead focus on
efficiency in achieving defense. Nevertheless, the use of economic data to evaluate or
predict the success of military systems can be quite problematic. Gus C. Lee (1983), for
example, observes that econometric models have less predictive power because of their
inability to forecast future management problems. At the same time, Moskos (1986) is
35 See Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years,"_in Fredland et al., eds..
Professionals on the Frontline.
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critical of defense planners who base their assessment of defense management mainly on
what he calls "hard" data. He believes that accepting only quantitative data as reliable is a
large drawback of the econometric analysis of military manpower procurement in the
U.S. As Moskos (1983) states, "a sheerly econometric logic would lead one to
conclude: (1) anyone who joins or stays in the service when he or she could earn a better
salary outside the military is stupid (or at least unaware of alternatives); (2) we should
pay patriotic service members less (because they would stay in the military at lower
recompense) than those motivated only by economic concerns; and (3) the most cost-
effective enlistment practice would be to recruit from Third-World nations." (Bowman et
al., 1986, p. 16) Following this line of thought, Eitelberg (1996) supports the need to use
a variety of factors to evaluate the success of all-volunteer recruitment in the U.S.
military. In his framework to assess the AVF in the U.S., Eitelberg emphasizes the
necessity to consider, in addition to the economic component (money), factors such as the
military's ability to attract quality labor, the efficient mix of manpower, mission
accomplishment, personnel morale, defense management practices, as well as what he
calls "mess control."
D. EVALUATION OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
The process of change in a defense system involves cost and a certain degree of
risk. To control for both variables, a detailed analysis is fundamental, as are clearly
defined goals and plans for the future. As previously noted, the problem with national
security, in particular, is the difficulty of measuring the output of military service in
36 See Charles C. Moskos, "The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique," in Bowman et al., The All-
Volunteer Force After a Decade.
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peacetime and thus providing decision-makers with an opportunity to evaluate the
success of defense management. Successful management of military service in
peacetime can be judged on the basis of military, social, political, and economic
components, which are introduced in the following sections.
1. Military Component
The "military" component of the evaluation scheme is related to the degree of
readiness and capability of the armed forces and the ability to fight or conduct military
operations successfully. To assess the capability of all parts of an armed force to conduct
certain functions, Laird (1980 b) suggests the analysis of four separate components:
1. Force structure , which includes the number and type of major units the
armed forces currently possess—e.g., the number of divisions, air wings,
and ships.
2. Modernization , which is the rate at which the nation is replacing or
adding to its major equipment—e.g., the number of tanks, planes, and
ships currently being procured in the annual defense budget.
3. Sustainabilitv , which is the ability of the force structure to conduct
military operations long enough and with sufficient intensity to achieve
objectives. "Sustainability focuses on such areas as the amount of
ammunition and spare parts currently possessed by the armed forces, the
ability of a nation to keep its deployed forces adequately supplied, and the
mobilization base of the country." (Laird, 1980 b, p. 2)
4. Readiness, which is the ability of the currently configured force structure
to perform its assigned mission whenever required. Readiness of a force or
unit is concerned with such issues as the ability to fulfill specific missions
and tasks (e.g., for a Minesweeper to conduct a minelaying operation or
for a corvette to launch its missiles).
Military readiness, unlike force structure, modernization, or sustainability, is
difficult to measure, especially in peacetime. The term "readiness" is used in many
different ways. It is used to denote individual and units' ability to do their jobs and to
denote national preparedness. The definition contained in a 1995 Joint Chiefs of Staff
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publication is the ability of forces, units' weapon systems, and equipment to deliver the
outputs for which they were designed, and "this includes the ability to deploy and
employ without unacceptable delays."
Any system used to measure readiness in peacetime can do so only through the
use of substitutes or surrogate indicators. NATO, for example, uses a unit reporting
system, called OpRep (Operational Readiness Report), to place units into one of five
following categories:
C- 1 : Fully combat-ready
C-2: Substantially combat-ready, that is, the unit has only minor deficiencies.
C-3: Marginally combat—ready, that is, the unit has major deficiencies but still
can perform its assigned missions.
C-4: Not combat-ready because the unit has so many deficiencies that it cannot
perform its wartime function.
C-5: Not combat-ready because the unit is undergoing a planned period of
overhaul or maintenance. (Laird, 1980b)
The three areas that are evaluated are personnel, equipment readiness, and
training. In the area of personnel, unit commanding officers compare the people in their
units with the number and type of people that they are supposed to have in the event of a
crisis or war. In the area of equipment readiness, commanding officers must evaluate the
actual condition or the quality of the weapon systems and supporting elements in the unit.
As in the other areas, they do this by comparing the actual condition of the equipment
with that prescribed by the service for wartime. Training is the most complex and
difficult area to quantify. Here, the commanding officers are asked to evaluate their
37 See Joseph J. Went, "The Readiness Challenge," in Fredland et al., eds., Professionals on the Front Line.
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unit's level of training. They have to estimate the time required for the unit to achieve
what the service defines as "full training," or they can evaluate the percentage of full
training that the unit has completed. The numerical designation for the combat-readiness
of a unit is determined by the lowest grade in the three categories.
Although this system seems to provide good information, the results depend
mainly on the personal judgment of the commanding officer and could, therefore, be
biased.
2. Social Component
The "social" component includes the ability to represent social values and ideals
in the military culture, as well as the degree of acceptance and integration of military
service in the community. The degree to which the military can fulfill this task is
sometimes evaluated on criteria that have little to do with fighting wars, but much to do
with current social or political discussions. The U.S. experience provides several good
examples. Some of the major public concerns of the 1990s in the U.S. revolve around
whether the military "represents" the national population and its ethnic groups at large;
whether women should serve in ground combat units; and whether homosexuals should
be allowed to serve in the armed forces. Although these problems may have no direct
influence on defense capability, they constitute important issues in military policy
considerations. A certain degree of acceptance and understanding of military issues in
society is fundamental for the armed forces to fulfill their missions in peace and war.
Fleckenstein (1988) concludes that the success of a military system lies in understanding
the history and culture of the military and society, a comprehensive analysis of the
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present situation, and awareness of factors that could affect the desired outcome of
military policy in the future.
3. Political Component
As the German Federal Minister of Defense, Volker Ruehe, observed in 1994: "If
the Bundeswehr is to accomplish the mission and to take up position in the state and
society, it is essential that politicians and society as a whole reach a fundamental
consensus and provide support." (White Paper, 1994, p. 131) At a 1983 conference on
the "All-Volunteer Force After A Decade," U.S. Ambassador Stanley Resor remarked
that the AVF has to be judged by the kind of fighting capability it demonstrates to carry
out the nation's foreign policy and sustain and support national security interests. The
"political" component, therefore, relates to the ability of the armed forces to transform
political policies into military strategies and readiness and to provide the government
with necessary credibility in its foreign policies. Furthermore, the military will be judged
on the degree of its integrity and loyalty to political decisions.
4. Economic Component
The "economic" component relates to the competence of the military to use scarce
resources efficiently. This includes the costs of personnel turnover and training and, in
particular, the net-productivity of military personnel and return on training investment.
Successful defense management is also assessed on the effectiveness of programs, such
as educational benefits, health care, and retirement plans. A volunteer military,
furthermore, will be evaluated on its ability to compete successfully with the civilian
38
See Bemhard Fleckenstein, "The Federal Republic of Germany," in Moskos and Wood, eds., The
Military.
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sector in different markets (i.e., within the labor market). This includes the ability to
attract, to recruit, and to retain a sufficient number of quality personnel to fill vacancies.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This discussion introduces the independent variable in the conceptual model that
explains successful implementation of an AVF. The discussion shows the importance of,
first, defining objectives and goals in the policy analysis process and, second, of finding
measurements that provide feedback. Unfortunately, such goals may not always be
clearly stated or even fully perceived by decision-makers. The discussions in Chapter III
and Chapter IV indicate that the expectations placed on the military are likely to be
multiple. Furthermore, they may often conflict, depending on whether they are the
expectations of sociologists, economists, politicians, or military leaders. Most of these
conflicts arise because a number of these expectations are intangible and cannot be
quantitatively measured; and, "some [may] even defy formulation." (Quade, 1989, p.
86) Laird (1980) argues that part of the problem in analyzing the state of military
preparedness is attributable to a confusion of terms, especially in the definition about
military capability and military readiness.
In conclusion, one can say that the success of an armed force is based on four
pillars: first, on social acceptance and integration; second, economic effectiveness and
efficiency; third, military capability and readiness; and, finally, military credibility with
Congress and the administration. The concept of the success of a military system can be
expressed in the simple analogy between the military system and an automobile. For an
automobile to run, it needs fuel, an engine, and wheels, among other things. Fuel, in this
context, symbolizes the military budget. The engine represents manpower and military
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technology, and the wheels—four in this case—are the political, economic, military, and
social components. To move the vehicle most effectively, controlling for engine
performance and fuel, all four wheels have to be properly inflated, balanced, positioned,
designed, and aligned. Just as omitting one of these components would bring the
automobile out of balance, ignoring one of the four components in the AVF model
would lead to a decline in military functionality and, therefore, loss of military capability.
Therefore, to manage military service competently and responsibly, defense
planners have to understand the individual effect of each of these factors on the success
of a military system, as well as the interrelationship between them. This point is
particularly important, especially for nations that would like to remove military
conscription or predict if all-volunteer recruitment would be successful.
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V. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND THEIR ESTIMATED EFFECTS
ON THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT AN AVF
A. INTRODUCTION
As Erwin Haeckle observes, "an assessment in economic terms is perhaps the
most intriguing aspect in a comparison of military manpower systems." (Haeckel, 1970,
p. 18) Many discussions about the effectiveness and efficiency of different military
systems center around cost comparisons between voluntary and conscripted soldiers and
voluntary and conscript armies.
Although economic considerations are not the only inputs to the ultimate policy
decision, as Moskos (1988) suggests, it is clear that resource and cost implications of the
various policy options play a central role. "The choice of public policy (i.e., whether to
end the draft or not to end the draft) is influenced by the amount of resources used by
each policy alternative, so identifying these real resources costs is crucial if the policy
choice is to be made." (Cooper, 1977, p. 67)
This chapter introduces, as Figure 5.1 shows, the economic factors and their
expected effects on the successful implementation of an AVF. Furthermore, it evaluates
the influences of resource factors, such as the "Military Participation Conscript Ratio"
and the "Military Participation Ratio" under economic considerations on the decision to
remove a draft. The discussion is based on the concept of economic and budget costs of
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Source: Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The
Organizational Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
Figure 5.1. The Effects of Economic Considerations on the Decision to
Implement an AVF
B. ECONOMIC COSTS VERSUS BUDGET COSTS OF MILITARY
MANPOWER
In general, one would expect a given country's tendency toward using volunteer
recruitment to be a function of the budget costs required to support an AVF. As
previously noted, the decision to implement an AVF is often related to the question of
cost. Cost, in fact, has many different interpretations. Webster's Encyclopedia
Dictionary , for example, defines cost as the "value" of the item in question. Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary defines cost as the amount paid or charged for something.
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Depending on who is paying, these definitions can mean very different things. Cooper
(1977) draws the distinction between budget and economic costs of military labor.
Budget cost, in his definition, reflects what the public pays in taxes to maintain a military
labor force. Economic cost, on the other hand, specifically measures the economic value
of labor resources used in the military. 39 This narrow definition of economic cost
includes the individual's alternative civilian wage, under the assumption that this wage
represents the value of his or her labor services in civilian employment.40
To maintain a military thus results in an opportunity cost to the civilian sector, or
"a cost that reflects the value of this labor as it could be used in other activities."
(Cooper, 1977, p. 67) In an AVF, budget costs and economic costs of military personnel
will generally coincide because the military has to pay the actual market value for the
desired quality of labor. The distinction between budget costs and economic costs is
particularly important during periods of conscription, since the draft enables the military
service (and hence the general taxpaying public) to pay less than the market wage for
military personnel.
39
This general definition may, in accordance with Cooper (1977), be interpreted in either of two ways: (1)
the opportunity costs to the civilian economy, in terms of productive output forgone; or (2) the opportunity
cost to the individual serving in the military.
40
The definition of value of labor is based on the concept of marginal productivity (MPL). The marginal
productivity of labor is the additional output that can be produced by a firm when it employs one additional
unit of labor, holding capital constant.
A firm that seeks to maximize profits will employ labor up until the point where the marginal revenue
(MR) it receives from hiring the last employee is equal its marginal cost (MC) of employing that worker.
The marginal cost of a unit of labor is the money wage rate that must be paid. The marginal revenue,
obtained from hiring an additional unit of labor, also called labor's marginal revenue product (MRP), is
equal to the additional output produced. Therefore, MRP = (MPL) * (MR).
By assuming that the firm sells its outcomes in a competitive market, where the price of the good does
not vary with quantity produced, that additional revenue per unit of output is simply the firm's product
price (P). Thus, for firms that operate in competitive markets; MRP = P * (MPL). As mentioned earlier, a
competitive firm maximize its profits where the marginal revenue of labor is equal to its marginal costs.
This situation is achieved at the point at which the marginal revenue product equals the money wage: P *
(MPL) = W. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994)
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1. Measurement of Economic Costs
The concept of underpayment has to do with the social issue of producing desired
goods and services in the least costly way. It is based on a comparison between the
wages actually paid in the civilian labor market and the market-clearing wage for a
specific job. At the individual level, however, it is often useful to compare the wage
received in a job to one's reservation rate, or the wage below which the worker would
refuse to work or quit the job. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994)
Cooper's (1977) interpretation of economic cost as the opportunity cost to
individuals serving in the military is based on the fact that, by serving in the military,
individuals forgo whatever monetary and nonmonetary benefits they could have earned in
adequate civilian employment. The standard labor supply model, introduced in Chapter
II, provides the basic framework to measure economic cost. Individuals can be arrayed
according to increasing supply price, which results in the supply curve shown in Figure
5.2.
The following scenario assumes that military manpower requirements are given.
The requirements for an armed force of size R* are shown as the distance between OR
out of the pool of eligible personnel. The military labor supply curve, in this case, shows
the proportion of individuals who would join the military voluntarily at any given wage.
To attract R* volunteers, the military has to pay an average wage rate equal to W*. The
smallest possible economic cost corresponding to this force size is given by the sum





Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
Figure 5.2. The Economic Cost of Manpower
2. The Concept of Conscription Tax
One of the consequences of the draft is the "implicit tax that conscription imposes
on young men [and women] of military age so-called conscription tax." (Cooper, 1 977,
p. 80) Explicit consideration of the conscription tax in this study is important for the
following reasons. First, conscription tax is, according to Cooper (1977), an important
element of public policy because it reduces the amount of direct taxes that must be levied
on the general public and, thus, redistributes income within society. And, second, it is
important because budget expenditures associated with manpower substantially under-
state the value of labor resources used by the military during periods of conscription.
Figure 5.2 shows the basic concept used to measure conscription tax.
Under competitive market conditions, the military has to offer an average wage
equal to W to be able to attract the R' volunteers. During times of conscription,
however, the military pays a wage equal to W*, which attracts only R* true volunteers.
To be able to sustain the desired force size of R*, the military has to fill the remaining
vacancies by drafting individuals from the upper level of the supply curve, or those who
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would not voluntarily join the services at the given wage level W*, for whatever reason.
These individuals, thus, have higher reservation rates than the individuals at the lower
end of the supply curve.
In the military labor supply model shown in Figure 5.3, conscription tax can be
thought of as the difference between the wage that would motivate an individual to join
the armed forces voluntarily and the actual draft wage under the assumption that the
military drafts the individuals with the lowest opportunity cost. The amount of the
conscription tax in the narrow definition is shown as the crosshatched area
41
R* R'
Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
Source: Adapted from Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force (Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Cooperation, 1977), p. 82.
Figure 5.3. Measuring of Conscription Tax
41 Economists such as Cooper, Sjaastad, and Hansen distinguish between a narrow and a broad definition of
the term conscription tax. The narrow definition defines the tax as the difference between the individual's
forgone civilian wage and the draft wage and is therefore equivalent to the concept described above. It is
shown as the cross-hatched area in Figure 5.3. Conscription tax under the broader definition also considers
forgone rents. This would result in the striped and cross-hatched area in Figure 5.3 Cooper sees the
importance of the distinction not so much that the two measures of conscription tax differ in magnitude,
but, rather, that they have very different meanings with respect to policy questions concerning the income
redistribution caused by the draft. (Cooper, 1977) The narrow definition views only those with higher
reservation rates as having to pay the tax, whereas the broader definition recognizes the draft extracted
from all serving in the military.
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3. Selection Process
Since the tax (i.e., narrow definition) is defined in terms of supply price, the
actual amount paid depends basically on two factors: (1) the shape and location of the
supply curve and (2) who on the supply curve actually serves in the military. (Cooper,
1977) These assumptions make it clear that the estimation of economic costs for a
compulsory military system is more difficult than explained in Figure 5.4 and depends
mainly on the policy used to select the draftees out of the eligible manpower pool.
Figure 5.4 shows the effect of the selection process on the economic cost of military
personnel during the draft.
Wage
R* R'
Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
Source: Adapted from Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All- Volunteer Force (Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Cooperation, 1977), p. 82.
Figure 5.4. Conscription Tax under Selection Process
The economic cost of military manpower under conscription depends mainly
upon who is drafted. At one extreme there is a draft .system that is structured in the way
that individuals at the lower income level are selected first, as it was practiced in the
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United States during World War I. Cooper calls this a "lowest-supply-price-drafted-first"
system. The result of such a policy would be that all military vacancies between R* and
R' would be filled with people who would serve voluntarily if the military wage were
equal to W\ On the other extreme, is a conscription system that is structured in the way
that it selects its draftees randomly out of the eligible manpower pool (e.g., a lottery
system). Some of those beyond point "b" on the supply curve would also be drafted
under this policy. Because individuals on the upper curve have either better earning
opportunities in the civilian market or more negative attitudes toward military, they are
generally less willing to join the armed forces. Both situations result in higher
reservation rates, an increase in the conscription tax, and, hence, a higher economic cost
of military manpower by the area "a-c-b."
One can conclude that the more random the selection process, and the more
representative of people on all portions of the supply curve, the higher the economic cost
of conscription attributable to the selection process. The increase of the conscription tax
and, therefore, the inequity issue, will be even greater when a nation considers a
reduction of its armed force and where, thus, the proportion of the eligible manpower
pool that is drafted will further drop down. However, as Figure 5.5 shows, when all
individuals in the eligible manpower pool must serve, the economic cost attributable to
the selection process diminishes.
Cooper (1977) observes that conscription tax is larger for the lottery-type draft
than what he calls pre-lottery type (i.e., universal military service). Table 5.1 shows the
results of his analysis of the conscription tax in 1964 under pre-lottery and lottery
systems.
42 Cooper concluded that the undesirable economic consequences of
42
Cooper's analysis is based on three alternative assumptions: (1) a constant elasticity supply curve
(upward sloping at a decreasing rate), (2) a linear supply curve (upward sloping at a constant rate), and (3)




Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool
Figure 5.5. Conscription Tax under Universal Military Service
Table 5.1. The Conscription Tax in 1964: Narrow Definition ($ Billions)
Selection Decreasing Slope Constant Slope Increasing Slope









Source: Cooper, Richard V. L. 1977. Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. Santa Monica, CA:
The RAND Cooperation.
conscription, holding everything else constant, are largely mitigated when a larger
fraction of the manpower pool must serve and, thus, the random character of the selection
process declines.
One can expect that the existence of a random selection process has a significant
positive effect on a nation's decision to change from conscription to all-volunteer
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recruitment, holding everything else constant. Haltiner (1997) supports this theory. He
states that, to the extent that conscription is practiced selectively and not universally, the
social and political pressure for the abolition of the draft rises as a result of this
development. Walter Y. Oi (1996) provides a good example of this:
As the draft for the Vietnam War, for example, became increasingly
selective and unpopular, angry voices raised against the existing
manpower procurement system spanned the political spectrum. Antiwar
activists and students from the left and the right rallied to oppose the war
and conscription. Richard Nixon, Tom Curtis, Gaylord Nelson, and Barry
Goldwater were among the politicians who had staked out a position
against the draft well before the outbreak of the Vietnam War. In his
second campaign for the presidency, Richard Nixon reiterated his position:
"It is not so much the way they are selected that is wrong, it is the fact of
selection." (Fredland et. al., eds., 1996, p. 43)
4. Military Participation Conscript Ratio
The Military Participation Conscript Ratio (MPCR) is defined as the percentage
of drafted individuals in a particular age group within a national population. It generally
refers to the group of persons who are 18-32 years old and includes conscripts with
regular and reserve status.
Historically, the inequity of conscripting young men for the armed forces has
been a controversial subject nearly every time the draft has been imposed. When a nation
considers to man its armed forces with draftees, inevitable issues arise regarding the
burden of paying the conscription tax and the redistribution of income that accompanies
the imposition of this tax burden.
The use of conscription leads to two types of income redistribution: inter-
generational and m/ragenerational transfers of income. The latter occurs because the
burden of paying the conscription tax tends to fall on the younger generation, usually on
young men between 16 and 35 years old and, thus, leads to a redistribution of income
from the younger generation to the older generations. Far more important, especially in
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setting public policy, is the intragenerational redistribution of income that takes place
when not all individuals of the eligible manpower pool are required to serve as draftees in
the military. This situation results in a redistribution of income between those who are
drafted and those who are not. (Cooper, 1977)
The extent of the inequity or, as the Gates Commission calls it, "the extent of the
discrimination resulting from conscription," (Gates Commission Report, 1970, p. 27)
depends on the proportion of the population forced to serve and the level of compensation
provided to those who serve. When a large fraction of the eligible population is
conscripted (e.g., 46 percent in Switzerland), then the tax is levied on a larger percentage
of the population, and the society will most likely be more supportive of its draft system.
Thus, on the one hand, it can be argued that universal military service, in which all must
serve (including women), makes conscription more equitable; although conscription falls
selectively on a narrow age cohort at any point in time, in the long run all will have to
serve. On the other hand, when only some people end up serving, the equity of the draft
may be questioned, thus significantly affecting the willingness of young men and women
to serve in the military.
The equity issue became the single most important factor in the move to end the
draft in the United States in 1973. As the result of some demographic trends, the number
of young men eligible for the military service more than doubled in the 20 years between
1955 and 1975. The military manpower required for the U.S. armed forces was no more
than one out of fifteen young people between the ages of 18 and 24. (Laird, 1980a). As
Cooper observes, "not only was the burden of conscription limited to a relatively small
segment of society-young men of military age-but the growing number of such young
men (because of the post-World War II "baby boom"), combined with relatively stable
force sizes...making conscription more inequitable over time." (Cooper, 1977, p. 40)
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There were, according to Laird (1980a), three courses of action available to the United
States to maintain adequate military manpower levels. The first was to continue to fulfill
military manpower requirements by using conscripts through a selective service system
and by increasing the wage of draftees up to a level of civilian occupations. The second
was to establish a national Universal Federal Service, which would provide conscript
services for all young people between 18 and 24 years old. This system, according to
Laird, "although costing the military less would cost our [the U.S.] Government a great
many tax dollars in finding millions of young people proper service employment at low
wage rates in hospitals, schools, urban and rural slums, and other areas." (Laird, 1980a,
p. 2) The final option was to establish the AVF, which pays a small percentage of the
population (approximately 1 .2 percent) for military service needed on a competitive basis
with other jobs in the civilian labor market.
Although the conscription tax is certainly not the only inequity associated with the
draft, this form of discrimination alone was sufficient that "the Executive Branch, the
Congress, and especially the young Americans of our [U.S.] country chose the third
[AVF] alternative." (Laird, 1980, p. 2)
The equity issue also arises when nations consider the reduction of their armed
forces and have to reduce the number of draftees. Great Britain provides a good
example. In 1957, the British Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, had issued a White
Paper for the government on defense policy; Great Britain had decided to rely more upon
a nuclear than a conventional deterrence. At the time, the British Government also had
decided to withdraw most of its forces east of Suez. (Tarr, 1 98 1 ) This dramatic change
in defense policy led to the decision to reduce the size of the British armed forces
substantially. Britain, at this time, was still inducting nearly every eligible young man
into the military service. With shrinking forces, universal conscription would provide too
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many persons unless the British government limited service to such a short term that no
effective training would be possible. Decision-makers faced two alternatives to universal
military service: selective service or all-volunteer recruitment. "British officials decided
that they could not defend selective service to the British people, arguing that such a
policy would cause political turmoil." (Tarr, 1981, p. 125) Consequently, Great Britain
chose all-volunteer recruitment to man its armed forces.
Downsizing and, hence, a decline in the MPCR, has occurred since the end of the
Cold War in almost all Western European nations. Haltiner (1997) observes that, in the
period 1987-1991, the average MPCR of 15 selected countries43 was above 50 percent. "
[T]his means that every second Western European citizen at the age between 18 and 32
had to reckon with being drafted for the military service in this time period." (Haltiner,
1997, p. 10) After 1991, the average MPCR dropped to nearly 33 percent. Figure 5.6
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Source: Karl W. Haltiner, "The Defined End of the Mass Army in Western Europe," Paper presented at
the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore,
MA, October 1997, p. 23.
Figure 5.6. Military Participation Conscript Ratio of 15 Western European
Nations, 1987-1995
43
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
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A declining MPCR and, therefore, an increasing inequity of sharing the burden of
defense, induced the decision in countries such as Belgium, The Netherlands, and even
the "motherland of conscription," France, to change their military system from
conscription to an AVF. (Haltiner, 1997) Bonnardot describes the situation in France as
follows:
These processes [force reduction and decline in social acceptance of the
military] led to a slow and hardly perceived erosion of the legitimacy of
conscription... conscription became more and more unequal... as a matter
of fact, military draftees were mainly underprivileged young Frenchmen
for it was much more interesting for graduates to be channeled through
civilian forms of service for which higher education was required. The
military lost its prestige in a general climate of lack of public interest.
(Bonnardot, 1997, p. 4)
In summary, one can conclude that military force downsizing, or an increasing
national population with a stable force size, causes the burden of conscription to be
carried by a smaller percentage of the eligible pool. Haltiner (1997) sees in the MPCR,
therefore, an indicator of the degree of military burden-sharing in a society. He assumes
that, with a decreasing MPCR and, hence, a decrease in the distribution of the burden, the
political and public pressure for removal of the draft system will increase. The
assumption is that, holding everything else constant that the MPCR is negatively related
to the decision to remove the draft. That means, a low MPCR will positively affect the
successful implementation of an AVF.
5. Military Participation Ratio
The Military Participation Ratio (MPR) is defined as the share of a country's
population that is either in the active or reserve forces of a nation. Haltiner (1997) sees
an advantage in this definition because "this number permits more accurate statements on
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the size of a country's armed forces than the absolute number of its size without any
demographic relations." (Haltiner, 1997, p. 6)
The importance of the proportion of the eligible manpower pool of a population
that must serve can be established by a simple comparison between the economic and
budget costs of military personnel under conscription and volunteer recruitment policies.
Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter discuss the relationship between the excess economic
costs of conscription and the proportion of the eligible pool that is required to serve in the
military. To understand why conscription might be preferred on economic grounds, it is
important to recognize that, although economic cost is (or should be) a key factor in the
public policy decision process, a number of other factors—not at least of which is budget
cost—are also important. (Cooper, 1977) Figure 5.7 shows a comparison of the
economic and budget costs of military manpower under all-volunteer conditions. As
previously noted, the sum of the supply prices of those serving in the military equals the
economic cost of military manpower. This is shown in Figure 5.7 as the area under the
supply curve and is an expression of the actual value of labor used. The budget cost of
military manpower, on the other hand, equals the average wage rate paid times the
number of personnel. Recall that an AVF has to offer an average wage rate that equals
the wage required to attract the last volunteer (i.e., the point where the demand curve for
military personnel intersects the supply of military labor). This fact raises the issue of
economic rent, which implies that some individuals will earn a higher wage than that for
which they would be willing to serve voluntarily. From a public policy standpoint,
Cooper (1977) questions how much economic rent would be appropriate because
economic rent "does not reflect 'real' economic activity but instead merely a transfer
payment from the general taxpaying public to those serving in the military." (Cooper,
1977, p. 91) Figure 5.7 shows how economic rent varies according to the proportion of
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the population base required to serve and how the MPR can affect the economic and
budget cost of military manpower.
Wage
R* R'
Proportion of the Eligible Manpower Pool.
1.0
Source: Adapted from Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force (Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Cooperation, 1977), p. 92.
Figure 5.7. Military Participation Ratio and its Effect on Economic and Budget
Cost
Consider two different situations. In the first, the demand for military personnel
is given by the curve Dl. To attract R* volunteers, the military must offer an average
wage rate equal to W* . The area under the supply curve from 0-R* gives the economic
cost here. The resulting budget costs (i.e., W* times R*) exceeds the actual value of
labor used by the amount of economic rent, shown in the Figure 5.7 as the striped area.
The demand for military personnel, in the second example, equals D2 and requires R'
volunteers. The military has to offer an average wage equal to W, which leads to the
fact that the budget costs, or the money taxpayers have to pay, exceed the actual value of
military personnel used by the sum of the striped plus the shaded area.
Both examples show that the budget cost of military manpower will increase
significantly if a larger proportion of the eligible pool base is required to serve, holding
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everything else constant. In contrast, the budget cost and, thus, the economic rent paid to
persons actually serving can be reduced substantially by use of a military conscription
system:
Some of these "savings" are not really savings in the true meaning of the
term since the economic, or real resource, cost of some of them exceeds
the draft wage. At the same time, much of the savings... are in fact a
reduction in the amount of economic rent paid [shown in Figure 1 .9 as the
shaded area]. That is, by implementing the draft the government reduces
the amount of budget cost that is transfer payment from the general public
to those serving in the military. (Cooper, 1977, p. 93)
The assumption, then, is that the MPR is negatively related to the successful
implementation of an AVF. One can assume that a country's tendency to use conscrip-
tion is higher when it maintains a relatively large military force compared to its
population size. However, all-volunteer recruitment is probably more preferable for
nations in which force requirements mean that a smaller fraction of the population must
serve. Table 5.2 supports this theory. It shows that the MPR of countries that already
have decided to implement an AVF lies between 0.2 percent in India and 2.9 percent in
Jordan. Germany (0.8 percent) and China (0.3 percent), which still rely on conscription,
seem to be exceptions. It should be mentioned that the classification of the Chinese
armed forces as either a conscription or AVF system varies in the literature.
6. Conscript-Volunteer Pay Ratio
As previously noted, the decision to implement an AVF is related to the estimated
budget costs of an all-volunteer system. On the most obvious level, volunteers are more
expensive than conscripts. They are better paid than conscripts for their services; indeed
conscripts, by definition, are "rendering some sort of forced labor extracted from them
with little or negligible remuneration." (Haeckel, 1970, p. 18) The pay differences
83
Table 5.2. Military Participation Ratio (MPR) and Force Sizes in Selected








USA 268 3,159,300 1.2 AVF
GB 59 592,200 1.0 AVF
Japan 126 282,300 0.2 AVF
Australia 19 91,050 0.5 AVF
Belgium 10 188,650 1.9 AVF
Canada 29 90,300 0.3 AVF
Netherlands 16 132,180 0.9 AVF
New Zealand 4 16,510 0.5 AVF
Jordan 5 139,050 2.9 AVF
Saudi Arabia 17 105,500 0.6 AVF
India 967 1,673,400 0.2 AVF
France 59 673,320 1.2 **
Germany 81 662,100 0.8 Draft
Austria 8 146,200 1.8 Draft
Switzerland 7 747,460 10.6 Draft
Denmark 5 103,350 1.9 Draft
Norway 4 267,600 6.1 Draft
Sweden 9 623,350 7.1 Draft
Finland 5 531,000 10.3 Draft
Spain 39 629,400 1.6 Draft
Portugal 10 270,200 2.74 Draft
Turkey 63 1,017,700 1.6 Draft
Greece 11 453,300 4.3 Draft
Russia 148 21,240,000 14.4 Draft
South Korea 46 5,172,000 11.3 Draft
China 1,221 4,040,000 0.3 Draft
Source: Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1997/1998
(London: Oxford University Press, 1997).
** France has already decided to implement an AVF, but is still in the transition phase.
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Between conscripts and volunteers in military systems with "mixed" force structure44
vary considerably among nations. Haeckle (1970), for example, reports that, among
army privates, the pay ratios, including monetary and nonmonetary benefits, between
conscripts and volunteers are 1: 16 in France, 1: 13 in Denmark, and 1: 1.6 in Germany.
The pay scales for conscripts and volunteers were almost identical in the U.S. three years
before the implementation of an AVF.
The basic assumption in the previous section is that, holding everything else
constant, a nation would be more inclined toward using conscription as the budget cost of
a volunteer military increases. The expected increase in the manpower budget after
changing the military system to an AVF, however, depends on two factors: first, on the
wage differential between the volunteers and draftees and, second, on the number of
vacancies that must be filled with volunteers once draft is abolished. The latter fact will
be considered in the next chapter.
Figure 5.8 shows the effects of different conscript-volunteer pay ratios on the
increase of the military budget after implementing an AVF. In a mixed force of size R',
the military has to pay a wage rate WV to attract a number of V volunteers. The
remaining vacancies must be filled with a number of C conscripts who receive a draft
wage rate WC. The manpower cost of this mixed force is shown in Figure 5.8 as the
shaded area.
Recall that the volunteer wage rate is defined as the wage that the military must
offer in a competitive labor market to attract the desired quality and quantity of personnel
That means that if the military wants to sustain an armed force of size R' it has to offer an
average wage rate of W to be able to replace the number of C conscripts with
volunteers. The resulting manpower budget is the area (W * R'). The expected increase
44
"Mixed" force structure in this model means that the active force of a nation consists of both, volunteers
and conscripts.
85
in the manpower budget can then be computed as follows: (W'-WV) * R' + (R'-V) *
(WV-WC).
The left-hand side of Figure 5.8 shows a high wage differential and, thus, a small
pay ratio between conscripts and volunteers. In this example, it can be expected that the
budget costs of military manpower will rise substantially after abolishing the draft. On
the right-hand side of Figure 5.8, the wage differential between conscripts and volunteers
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Figure 5.8. The Effect of the Conscript-Volunteer Pay-Ratio in a Mixed Force on
the Increase in Manpower Budget after the Implementation of an
AVF
is relatively small. In this situation, it can be expected that the military manpower budget
of an AVF will only slightly increase, controlling for everything else.
One can conclude that, as the lower the pay ratio, the higher will be the budget
increase of military manpower under an AVF. The higher the estimated costs of a policy,
holding everything else constant, the less likely is the opportunity that this policy (i.e., the
implementation of an AVF) will be supported by government, congress, and society.
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The assumption is that the conscript-volunteer pay ratio is significant in our
conceptual model and has a positive effect on the successful implementation of an AVF.
C. LEARNING AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE CIVILIAN
LABOR MARKET
Economic factors, such as the unemployment rate or the civilian wage rate, are
exogenous to military policy control. This implies that military defense planners can
only recognize and react to trends in the civilian economy rather than take any sort of
initiative. Because of this, Eitelberg (1996) emphasizes the importance of having
accurate and current information, as well as a set of plans and management procedures to
counteract manpower shortfalls.45 In evaluating the learning experience in the U.S., he
observes that changes in the economy—in the youth labor force in particular—can have a
significant effect on the military's ability to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel.
The assumption is that, as earning and employment opportunities in the civilian economy
improve, the military finds it more difficult and, thus, more expensive (i.e., because of
increasing recruiting and advertising efforts, and higher monetary and nonpecuniary
incentives) to recruit the same quality and quantity of military personnel without the
pressure of a draft.
1. Unemployment Rate
As mentioned above, an AVF has to compete in the labor market for its recruits.
Military economists such as Gilroy (1990), Warner (1990), and Nelson (1986) assert that
the recruiting process and, therefore, the success of an AVF depends largely upon both
45
See Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years,"_in Fredland et al., eds.,
Professionals on the Frontline.
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economic conditions and the level of resources at the military's disposal. Nelson (1986)
sees the unemployment rate, in particular, as one of the basic and, perhaps, the most
critical measurable economic factor that primary determines military enlistment. The
"hollow force" of the late 1970s in the U.S., in his view, was the result of ignoring the
effects of unemployment on enlistment supply and relying too much on the effects of
military pay on recruiting. As Nelson (1986) states:
Because unemployment is so much more volatile than pay, even a
relatively small elasticity can have demonstrably large effects. Overall
unemployment rates, for example, doubled between 1979 and 1983. At an
elasticity of only 0.2, which is consistent with the Gates Commission's
approach, enlistment would increase by about 20 % due to unemployment
changes reported above. (Bowman et al., 1986, p. 44)
Warner (1990) also observes a strong relationship between the civilian youth
unemployment rate and the enlistment of high quality recruits and claims that recruiting
becomes more successful under a low unemployment situation when recruiting
conditions deteriorate and/or when recruiting resources are adequate.
In studying the effects of unemployment on high quality enlistment in the U.S.
Armed Forces, Warner (1990) observes that the estimated effect of unemployment on
high quality enlistments is positive, significant, and stable across the models. Table 5.3
indicates that each ten-percent increase in the civilian unemployment rate tends to change
high-quality recruitment by 4.4 to 5.5 percent. The estimates for the Air Force are
smaller, but still statistically significant. These trends are also supported by several other
studies.
46
"For these other services, the decline in the civilian unemployment rate [e.g.,
46 See Nelson, "The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer Force," in The
All-Volunteer Force After a Decade, pp. 40-42.
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Table 5.3. Estimated Percentage Changes in High-Quality Enlistments Due to a
10 Percent Increase in the Youth Unemployment Rate
Army Navy USMC Air Force
Factor AB AB AB AB
Unemployment 5.5 4.5 4.8 4.4 4.8 4.4 2.0 1.4
Note: Model A includes a time trend, while model B does not.
Source: Adapted from John T. Warner. "Military Recruiting Programs During the 1980s: Their Success
and Policy Issues." (Contemporary Policy Issues, Vol. VIII, October 1990), p. 57.
in the United States] from 9.5 percent in 1983 to 5.3 percent in 1988 is estimated to have
reduced high quality enlistments by between 17 and 24 percent." (Warner, 1990, p. 56)
Therefore, it can be expected that the unemployment variable is significant and positive
in our conceptual model. This means that a country with a higher youth unemployment
rate is more likely to successfully implement an AVF, holding everything else constant.
2. Gross National Product Per Capita
One of the previous conclusions was that a successful implementation of an AVF
is negatively correlated to the size of the armed forces and, therefore, to the fraction of
the society that must serve in the military. We assumed that any country's tendency to
use an AVF is a function of the budget required to support an all-volunteer military. The
budget required to support an AVF depends on the monetary and nonpecuniary incentives
the military has to pay compete successfully against private employers for qualified
young men and women. This implies that, if the military pays better than the civilian
sector, and if the civilian sector is near the subsistence standard of living, then the
military finds it easier to attract potential recruits Conversely, "[w]hen the standard of
living is higher, the military finds it more difficult to recruit personnel without the
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pressure of the draft, not necessarily because military service is inherently unattractive,
but because it must compete with many employers." (Cooper, 1977, p. 60) Cooper
( 1 977) concludes that the poorer the nation and the smaller the force, the easier it is to fill
vacancies at a given wage rate and, therefore, the less costly it is to implement an AVF.
Table 5.4 helps to explain much of the variation in manpower procurement
policies used by different countries.
Although conscription remains the predominant method of manpower procure-
ment worldwide, an increasing number of countries (e.g., Belgium and The Netherlands)
decided some time ago or recently (e.g., France) to rely solely on all-volunteer
recruitment. As Table 5.4 shows, none of the major advanced nations employing a
volunteer military maintains a military force near the size (either in total number or in the
MPR) of the United States. Belgium (1.9 percent) and Jordan (2.9 percent) seem to be
exceptions in relation to their MPR and India (1,145,000) in relation to its force size.
But, India and Jordan have a standard of living closer to a subsistence level, as measured
by GNP per capita.
As Cohen observes, "the sheer bulk and poverty of their peasant population have
ensured that enough men would be attracted to military service by the lure of glory,
plunder, or, above, sheer security, to meet any national emergency." (Cohen, 1985, p.25)
India, for example, was able to raise an army of over two-and-a-half-million people by
voluntary enlistment during the Second World War. (Cohen, 1985)
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Table 5.4. Gross-National-Product (GNP) per Capita and Force Sizes in











USA 7.6 27,600 1,447,600 1.2
GB 1.2 19,600 213,800 1.0
Japan 4.6 23,200 235,600 0.2
Australia 0.351 20,000 57,400 0.5
Belgium 0.262 21,900 44,450 1.9
Canada 0.569 22,100 61,600 0.3
Netherlands 0.352 20,600 57,180 0.9
New Zealand 0.054 16,800 9,550 0.5
Jordan 0.007 4,500 104,050 2.9
Saudi Arabia 0.136 10,200 105,500 0.6
India 0.371 1,500 1,145,000 0.2
Source: Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1997/1998.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Haltiner (1997) finds support for the hypothesis that the mass army format in
Western European nations and, thus, a country's tendency of using conscription, tends to
decline with a country's growing affluence. This finding is based on the assumption that
the "socio-economic" modernization and the high living standard in highly industrialized
modern societies tends to favor the trend toward volunteer systems. Haltiner found only a
small correlation between these variables and concluded that geo-strategic changes such as
the end of the Cold War and new missions, are far more important causes of the "noted
accelerated recent change of force formats than the economic growth in Western
societies." (Haltiner, 1997, p. 14)
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It can, therefore, be expected that economic wealth or the living standard of a
society has a negative effect on the successful implementation of an AVF. But, the effect
will diminish and become almost insignificant by adding other variables, particularly,
political and social ones.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter V introduces economic variables and their estimated effects on the
successful implementation of an AVF. The assumption examined is that policy makers
are influenced mainly by the expected budget cost of military manpower when
considering a change to an all-volunteer recruiting system.
As noted earlier, the policy problem centers on how much economic rent is
desirable, though it is clear that there is no single or "right" solution to this problem. But,
there can be dislocation when the amount of economic rent is very large, as it will almost
be the case in an AVF, when a large fraction of the population base is required to serve.
(Cooper, 1977) This explains why conscription is probably preferred when a country
maintains a very large military force relative to its population base. An AVF, on the other
hand, is probably preferable for countries with low MPRs and low MPCRs and can be
used to support a much larger military capability than appear at first.
The chapter also reveals that military defense planners can only recognize and
react to trends in the civilian economy rather than take the initiative. Therefore, the
successful implementation of an AVF relies on constant tracking and analysis of economic
trends to find the appropriate methods to counteract manpower shortfalls. The need for
constant vigilance on the part of senior military and political leaders is required, especially
during the transition from a draft to an AVF.
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The discussion also shows the importance of considering social and political
factors in the policy analysis process. In particular, the equity issue and questions about
who carries the burden of conscription have growing influence over a country's decision
to remove the draft. Cohen (1985), therefore, claims that the decision between an AVF
and the draft in most countries depends more on political, social, and military
circumstances than on economic considerations. He observes that most countries adopt
some form of conscription, especially if they face the prospect of an invasion by a hostile
neighbor across land borders. Thus, Cohen concludes that perhaps the "best predictors of
a country's system of military service are the length of its land borders with potentially
hostile neighbors and the size of its population relative to that of its neighbors." (Cohen,
1985, p. 25) A GAO study (1988), which investigates potential impacts and other issues
on the military draft system in the U.S., tends to support Cohen's assumption. GAO
observes that, while a majority of young Americans favor bringing back the draft if war
breaks out, only 25 percent support a peacetime draft. (GAO, 1988) It can be seen, then,
that "the organizational format of a recruiting system for the armed forces, conscription
or all-volunteer forces, is a synthesis, and a compromise, between defense requirements
stemming from the external geostrategic situation and the domestic price a nation accepts
to pay in terms of individual freedom, budget, for its security at a particular time in
moment." (Bonnardot, 1997, p. 3) Although economic factors might not be the initiators
for a change from a draft to an all-volunteer military, they are clearly significant enough
to ensure the future success of an AVF.
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VI. MILITARY DESIGN FACTORS
A. INTRODUCTION
The initial issue in the debate of whether the U.S. military should remove the draft
or not was, according to Cooper (1977), one of determining what it would cost to
implement and sustain an all-volunteer force of the desired size and composition and
whether it would be worthwhile to bear these costs. In the later years of the AVF, this
issue has become one of assessing how well the military has fared in meeting their
quantitative and qualitative recruiting objectives. The feasibility issue thus reduces
primarily to one of military manpower procurement. The key problem defense planners
are facing is two-sided. First, defense planners have to locate and try to control factors,
which might influence the supply of military labor and, therefore, the cost of an AVF,
and, second, they have to define their demand for the right mix of quality personnel and
technology to ensure an efficient use of their resources.
Chapter VI introduces several variables that determine the structure and
functionality of the armed forces, the so-called military design factors and their estimated
effects on the successful implementation of an AVF. Chapter II mentions recruiting as a
part of the military design factor component. Recruiting is not part of Chapter VI
because it does not directly represent a condition that favors the decision to remove the
draft, but more a method to fill vacancies with quality personnel. Figure 6.1 shows the




















^ r" Quality / Quantity















Source: Adapted from David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing
Organizational Behavior" in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland. The
Organizational Behavior Reader. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1991)
* Adapted from Jay R. Galbraith. Organization Design^ (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, Inc., 1977), p. 30.
Figure 6.1. Military Design Factors
B. LENGTH OF MILITARY SERVICE
Although the analysis so far has focused primarily upon labor stocks, i.e., the
numbers of personnel employed in the military, the method of military manpower
procurement has an even stronger effect on labor flows. The relationship between
personnel turnover and the method of military manpower procurement is, in a sense,
obvious. That is, personnel turnover rates are inversely related to the average length of
service, and the average length for personnel in the armed forces varies according to the
method of recruiting. Thus, armed forces that rely on conscription tend to have higher
96
personnel turnover rates than do all-volunteer military services because the use of
conscription tends to reduce the average length of service. But, conscription systems
themselves vary, in that those with shorter tours tend to have higher rates of personnel
turnover. As Table 6.1 shows, military service obligations vary in different countries
between six months (Austria) and 48 months (China). Therefore, one can conclude that
personnel turnover rates are a function not only of whether conscription is used, but also
of the length of obligated military service in a nation.
According to Cooper (1977), personnel turnover is not necessarily undesirable.
Sometimes, as the White Paper on Security of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994)
states, turnover ensures that the military is able to fall back on a cross section of young
men's and women's abilities, skills, and professional qualifications. Personnel turnover
(i.e., those that are induced by the length of service) must, therefore, be evaluated in the
context of its effects on defense capabilities and costs, especially given that reductions in
personnel turnover rates are not costless, either.
As mentioned earlier, military capability is a function of the amount of labor input
to the defense mission. Personnel turnover affects military capability, according to
Cooper (1977), in three important ways:
1. "Down Time"
"Down time" results from accessions, training, transit, etc., for new recruits. This
implies that fewer productive "man-years" are realized from a given number of recruits
when personnel turnover rates are high. Therefore, the assumption is that, if the average
length of military service (LS) declines, the personnel turnover rate (PTR) increases.
This leads to the result that the ratio of "productive" time (PT) to "unproductive" time
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Table 6.1. Length of Compulsory Military Service in Selected Countries, 1996-1997
Nation Length of Military Service
France 10 months, can be voluntarily expanded to 12-24 months
Germany 10 months, can be voluntarily expanded to 12-23 months
Austria 7-8 months ( depends on refresher training or not)
Denmark 4-12 months (up to 24 months in certain ranks)
Norway 1 2 months, plus 4—5 months refresher training periods
Sweden Army, Navy 7-15 months, Air Force 8-12 months
Finland 8-11 months (11 months for officers, NCO, and Soldiers
with special duty)
Spain 9 months
Portugal Army 4-8 months, Navy and Air Force 4-1 8 months
Turkey 1 8 months
Greece Army up to 19 months, Navy and Air Force up to 21
months
Russia 18-24 months
South Korea Army 26 months, Navy and Air Force 30 months
China Army 36 months, Navy and Air Force 48 months
Source: Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/1998.
(London: Oxford University Press., 1997).
(UPT) of draftees decreases, holding everything else constant. This relationship can be
shown in the following flow diagram:
I (LS) - t (PTR) -> I (PT/UPT)
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2. Recruits versus Training Support
The assumption is that each person-year of conscription training requires a
person-year of training support. Therefore, if the length of military service decreases, the
number of recruits (R) increases, holding everything else constant. An increase in the
number of recruits requires more training hours per unit (T) and, thus, the need for more
training support (TS) (i.e., instructors, support staff, etc.). This implies that higher
personnel turnover means that more otherwise productive personnel are diverted from
defense missions to the support of military training, which can result in a decline in
military readiness (MR) and capability. The following flow diagram shows this
relationship:
i (LS) -» t (R) -> t (T) -» t (TS) -> i (MR)
3. Job Performance
It can be expected that less-experienced personnel cannot perform many jobs as
well as more-experienced ones, especially in an age of high technology. Thus, defense
planners face the questions about the degree to which less-experienced soldiers can
substitute for more-experienced soldiers, and whether this substitution effect influences
military capability. Cooper (1977) assumes that very large turnover rates can degrade
overall force capability significantly. Thus, a decline in the length of military service
implies a decrease of expertise (E) in the force and reduces military capability (MC)
significantly, holding everything else constant. This relationship can be described by the
following flow diagram:
i (LS) - I (E) -> i (MC)
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In summary, one can say that, because conscripted forces generally have shorter
tours of duty than of an AVF, they tend to require more personnel (i.e., conscripts and
professionals) to ensure the same level of manpower productivity, holding everything
else constant. Further, among conscripted forces, those with much shorter times of
military service generally tend to require far more personnel than those with longer
periods of obligated service to achieve the same level of military capability. This
indicates that conscription is a very inefficient military system for maintaining a standing
force at the same performance and readiness level when the length of conscription is very
short, especially in modern and technologically sophisticated armed forces.
Cooper writes: "In fact, not only do very short conscription tours increase the
economic costs associated with maintaining a military labor force (since they increase the
ratio of total personnel required to the amount of productive labor input), they can also
increase budget costs, since so many more personnel are required." (Cooper, 1977, p. 80)
A March 1988 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) supports Cooper's
thesis. In studying the potential impacts on a probable draft system in the U.S., the GAO
concludes that if the U.S. government reinstated the draft, "long-term budgetary savings
would be $7.8 billion a year in 1987 dollars." (GAO, 1988, p. 24) The report assumed
that draftees would serve for two years, that the military would stay the same size, and
that pay for all first-term personnel would be cut by half for the first two years of service.
But, when GAO tried to estimate the costs of switching to a conscript system with
approximately the same effectiveness as the AVF in 1988, the picture changed
substantially. As GAO reports:
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The estimated budgetary cost savings associated with the draft diminish
and eventually disappear.... Our analysis indicates that if force effective-
ness is measured by the number of personnel with 1 2 months of service,
the draft force results in net long-term budgetary savings of about $4
billion. But if 24 months are required to become fully effective, the
volunteer force is less expensive than the draft by about $2.6 billion.
(GAO, 1988, p. 34)
It can be assumed that the length of military service will negatively affect the
successful change from conscription to an all-volunteer armed force, holding everything
else constant. This means that it is more likely that the decision to implement an AVF in
countries with very short terms of service (e.g., Portugal, Spain, and Austria) will find
more political and public acceptance, especially in light of economic considerations, than
in countries with very long terms of obligation (e.g., China and South Korea).
A further reduction of the length of military service, like that in modern Western
Nations, can lead to the following results. Assuming a constant military budget and
military technology, one result would be a decrease in military capability and, therefore,
a loss of prestige and public interest. National service would be perceived more and
more as a means to solve social problems through civil tasks rather than as a mandatory
way to defend a nation's territory. (Bonnardot, 1997) The second result would be an
inefficient use of resources (i.e., military personnel and budget) if a nation intends to
maintain the same level of military readiness and performance.
C. FORCE STRUCTURE
Another significant factor affecting the successful implementation of an AVF is
the organizational structure of the military organization. The structure of a military draft
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system is determined primarily by the Ration between conscripts and volunteers in the
services and by the role of reserve forces in the military's "Total Force" policy.
1. Conscript Ratio
The Conscript Ratio (CR) is defined as the percentage of active members of a
nation's armed forces who are draftees. Haltiner (1997) sees the CR as the most
significant indicator of the organizational format of a nation's armed forces because it
provides information about the degree to which recruits join voluntarily or are
conscripted. The inclusion of the CR variable in our conceptual model is based on two
assumptions. First, the percentage of conscripts that must be replaced by volunteers can
affects the manpower budget of an AVF considerably. Second, there is a correlation
between the percentage of conscripts in the armed forces and the number of individuals
drafted out of the eligible pool. The latter relationship has a significant effect on the
previously mentioned equity issue—that is, sharing the burden of the conscription tax.
Table 6.2 shows the CR in selected countries along with the intention of these countries
to further reduce the ratio.
As seen in Table 6.2, a nation's armed forces can be categorized according to
three different "types." Haltiner (1997) distinguishes between three different types of
conscripted forces:
a. Type I (Pseudo Conscript Forces)
This category is comprised of military organizations in which the fraction
of conscripts is below 50 percent of the total active armed forces. Although the majority
of military personnel are volunteers, Type I armed forces rely principally on universal
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Table 6.2. Conscript Ratio (CR), Force Format, Military Participation












Switzerland 99.0 Type III 46.36 Unclear
France 41.0 Type I 2.46 Yes (by 100%)
Germany 44.0 Type I 1.81 Yes
Austria 36.0 Type I 1.86 Unclear
Denmark 24.0 Type I 1.38 No
Norway 59.0 Type II 4.03 Yes (by 25%)
Sweden 73.0 Type III 4.34 Yes (by 10%)
Finland 76.0 Type III 4.58 No
Spain 55.0 Type II 2.20 Yes (by 54%)
Portugal 22.0 Type I 1.05 Yes
Turkey 83.0 Type III 5.91 No
Greece 73.0 Type III 9.85 No
Russia 31.0 Type I 2.42 Yes
South Korea 24.0 Type I 2.45 Yes
China 45.0 Type I 0.73 Unclear
Source: Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/1998.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1997).
* See Haltiner, Karl W. 1997. The Defined End of the Mass Army in Western Europe. Zurich, Switzerland:
Department of Military Science Swiss Military College at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH).
(a) Haltiner (1997) distinguishes between three different types of conscripted forces: First, Type I ,
military organizations with a CR below 50 percent. Second, Type II, military organizations with a CR
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between 50 percent and 67 percent. Finally, Type III, military organizations in which a CR above 67
percent.
(b) Military Participation Ratio (MPCR) is defined as the percentage of drafted individuals in a
particular age group within a national population.
conscription to fill their vacancies. They seem to exploit their conscript manpower to a
very low extent and use the draft mainly as personnel reservoir to supplement their
mostly-volunteer forces. Thus, a Type I armed force exhibits essentially more the
character of an all-volunteer military than that of a conscript army. As Table 7 shows,
the armed forces of France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Russia, South Korea,
and China pass for Pseudo Conscript Forces.
Haltiner (1997) also reports that the recruiting methods of Type I armed
forces are more selective than those of universal conscription. He assumes, therefore,
that the decision to abolish the draft in countries with Type I armed forces finds more
political and public support than in countries with a higher CR, under the aspect of
military burden equality.
b. Type II (Soft-Core Conscript Forces)
Military organizations in which the percentage of conscripts fall between
50 percent and 67 percent are called Soft-Core Conscript Forces. Haltiner (1997)
observes that, in Western Europe, nations with Type II armed forces tend to have lower
MPCRs and have started practicing conscription more selectively rather than universally.
He believes, therefore, that universal conscription will become a political issue in these
nations, with discussions focusing on how to distribute the burden of military service
most equitably.
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c. Type HI (Hard-Core Conscript Forces)
This category contains all military organizations with a CR above 67
percent and an absolute and high dominance of conscripts in the force structure. Nations
with Type III armed forces tend to have higher MPCRs and use universal rather than
selective conscription. A higher MPCR also implies that the burden of the conscription
tax is distributed over a larger percentage of the population; and the society of a Type III
nation will tend to be more supportive of its draft system.
It can be expected that the "Conscription Ratio" is significant and
positively related to the successful implementation of an AVF.
2. The Reserve Ratio
Readiness of military organizations cannot be judged without taking account of
the reserves. In nations that base their foreign and national security policies on the so-
called "Total Force"
47
concept, the reserves are vital to ensuring the sustainability and
operational readiness of the armed forces. Owing to the fact that the main defense forces
are heavily dependent upon mobilization, reservists are needed for virtually all
assignments, including the command of units and formations and, to a higher degree than
in the past, the operation of primary weapons. (White Paper, 1994) Reserve forces
represent, therefore, an important and integral part of military planning. As Marshall
writes:
Today, many reserve units have no counterpart in the active-duty forces
[in the United States]. These include 'heavy' non-attack units, infantry
47 The "Total Armed Forces" equals the sum of the active forces and the number of people in the reserve
forces that can be mobilized when political or military circumstances require it. In the U.S., the "Total
Force" actually includes four elements: the active-duty military, the Reserves, civilian employees of the
government, and defense contractor.
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scout groups and railroad units. And reserves are not limited to support
roles. The Army National Guard, for example, represents more than 40
percent of the Army's total combat manpower. (Editorial Research Report
No. 2, 1991, p. 25)
The role of reserve forces is getting even more important because military
organizations generally reduce the number of active-duty military personnel after the
implementation of an AVF. This fact implies that active forces in an all-volunteer system
are not numerous enough to fulfill all the required qualifications in operations. The Gates
Commission (1970) realized that the reserve forces would take on more importance in an
all-volunteer environment due to the smaller size of the active force and the diminishing
capability, without the draft, to rapidly expand the active force during mobilization.
Therefore, the Commission recognized "from its first meeting the need for special
attention to the problem of the reserves forces [in the United States]." (Gates Report,
1970, p. 95) This was especially true because, as surveys in the late 1960s had indicated,
approximately 75 percent of the enlisted personnel fulfilling their initial six-year military
service obligation in the in the U.S. reserve forces were there only due to prior service in
the U.S. armed forces as draftees. According to Cooper (1977), perhaps the most serious
problem to emerge from the AVF experience in the U.S. is the reserve forces' difficulty
in attracting a sufficient quantity of recruits with the necessary levels of quality. His
assumption is based on the fact that the U.S. reserve forces had experienced considerable
recruiting problems in the post-draft period. As Cooper writes:
They [the Reserve Forces] have not been able to attract the desired
numbers of NPS [Non-Prior-Service] male recruits, and as a result, reserve
enlisted strength has declined (in some cases substantially) relative to
those of the early 1 970s. Moreover, the quality of NPS male recruits, as
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measured by education attainment and mental aptitude, likewise seems to
have declined. (Cooper, 1977, p. 156)
Consequently, must ask: can an AVF sustain a reserve component that will fulfill
all the qualitative and quantitative requirements once fulfilled through the draft? To help
answer this question, one has to consider the so-called Reserve Ratio (RR), which is
defined as the percentage of reservists in the "Total Forces." Table 6.3 shows the
calculated RR for several Western European countries that have compulsory military
service. As Table 6.3 indicates, the proportion of the reserves in a force structure can
vary considerably, from 37 percent in Turkey to more than 99 percent in Switzerland.
This means that in countries with a lower RR (such as Turkey, Germany, and France)
rely more heavily on the active component than do countries with a higher RR (such as
Switzerland and Finland).
Thus, one can expect that the decision to remove the draft has significant
consequences on the structure, quantity, and quality of the reserve force—a fact that can
be, according to Brinkerhoff and Grissmer (1986), the weak link in the total force
strategy of a nation under all-volunteer conditions.
Although the RR provides a good idea about the importance of the reserve
component in the military force structure, the ratio cannot establish a link between the
recruiting policies in the active and reserve forces. However, this connection is essential
for predicting or estimating the effects of removing the draft on the quality and quantity
of reserve forces. Therefore, it is necessary to consider, in addition to the RR, the
48
See John R. Brinkerhoff and David W. Grissmer, "The Reserve Forces in An All-Volunteer Environ-
ment," in Bowman et al., eds., The All-Volunteer Force After A Decade.
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Table 6.3. The Percentage of Reserve Forces in the Total Force Structure
(Reserve Ratio) in Western European Conscript Forces, 1996-1997
Nation Total Force Reserve Reserve Ratio
%
Switzerland 360,760 357,460 99
France 673,320 292,500 43
Germany 662,100 315,000 48
Austria 146,200 100,700 69
Denmark 103,350 70,450 68
Norway 267,600 234,000 87
Sweden 623,350 570,000 91
Finland 531,000 500,000 94
Spain 629,400 431,900 69
Portugal 270,200 210,900 78
Turkey 1,017,700 378,700 37
Greece 453,300 291,000 64
Italy 809,150 484,000 60
Source: Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/1998.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1997).
average conscript ratio (ACR) of a nation. The ACR is defined as the percentage of
conscripts in the active forces over a specific period of time. The advantage of using the
ACR instead of the CR is that the latter provides information only for a specific point in
time, whereas the ACR controls for long-term trends in the military organization.
108
As Bonnardot (1997) states, in countries with compulsory military service, the
reserve concept is closely related to conscription because of the fact that reserve forces
are manned mainly by former draftees. One can thus expect, holding everything else
constant, that nations with "Soft- or Hard-Core Conscript" forces are more likely than
nations with "Pseudo Conscript" forces to recruit their reserve forces out of the pool of
draftees. At the same time, one can assume that Type I military organizations are more
likely than Type II or III armed forces to base their "Total Force Structure" on active
units. Therefore, one can expect a smaller effect on the military capability of their "Total
Forces" if the draft is abolished.
It can be assumed that the RR is significant and has a negative effect on the
successful implementation of an AVF. This means that, when the proportion of reserve
forces in the "Total Force" structure is large, the role of the reserve in the foreign and
national security policy of a country is also large. It is important to note that the influence
of the RR variable on the successful implementation of an AVF would be biased and
overestimated by omitting the ACR.
D. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
As previously noted, the demand for labor is a function of technology. The
assumption is that the level of technology used in an organization affects its demand for
manpower significantly. The direction of the estimated effect is twofold. First, the effect
will be negative if labor and technology are substitutes in the production process, and an
organization can reduce its manpower (i.e., less-skilled employees) drastically by
introducing a higher level of technology. And, second, the sign of the estimator is
positive if two inputs (i.e., technology and high-quality personnel) are complements in
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the production process and, thus, both must be used together. In this case, an increased
use of technology implies the need to increase the number of skillful, well-trained, and
experienced personnel to maximize the level of productivity. In structuring the military
system, defense planners must, therefore, evaluate how the use of highly sophisticated
combat systems will influence the demand for quality and quantity of military personnel.
The "right" mix between technology and military manpower (i.e., quality and quantity) is
essential to using all defense inputs efficiently and to maximizing force capability and
readiness.
The relationship between technology and work has been a subject of increasing
attention over the years. According to Martin Binkin (1994), the armed forces have, in
recent years, devoted considerable resources to predicting the impact of new technologies
on skill levels. One issue discussed is whether changes in technology foster a need for a
broader or a narrower variety of skills or for a higher or a lower average skill level.
49
Many high-tech supporters have pledged that the introduction of "smart" systems would
lead to the sufficient substitution of capital for labor, enabling a given task to be
performed with fewer and less-skilled people. Binkin (1994), however, cites historical
evidence, which indicates a variety of chronic problems with the reliability and
maintainability of new weapon systems. As he notes, the upshot of this evidence is that
new weapon systems will demand even more skillful operators, especially if the
capabilities of new systems are to be fully exploited. Many military leaders support this
point, as well. If a military organization is to realize a full return on its substantial
49
See Martin Binkin, "Military Technology and Army Manpower" in Mark J. Eitelberg and Steve L.
Mehay, eds., Marching Toward (he 21" Century.
110
investment in technology, a better match between humans and machines will have to be
fashioned. Binkin (1994) sees two ways to approach this issue. First, machines could be
designed to fit the "man" by making them more reliable and easier to operate and
maintain; and, second, military personnel could become more technologically proficient
through improvements in training technologies and techniques. 50 Steven Leeven (1983)
supports the latter approach. In his framework explaining soldier's proficiency, he
emphasizes the importance of considering the effects of the so-called personal-match
factor on military capability and, therefore, the need to relate personnel potential to the
weapon systems a force will operate. 51
Figure 6.2 shows a conceptual model of the person-machine match factor as a




(RAW MATERIAL) x (TRAINING) x (EXPERIENCE)
Source: Adapted from Steven A. Leveen, A Technique for Assessing Personnel Potential of Ground
Forces: Methodology and Trial Assessments (Arlington, VA: The Analytic Science Corporation,
1983), p. 4-3.
Figure 6.2. The Person-Machine Match Function
50
Ibid.
51 Leveen (1983) defines "personnel potential" as the potential of military personnel to exploit fully the
capabilities of their equipment in operational situations.
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Leveen's idea behind constructing the person-match function in this way is to
conform to the consensus that, when the skills of the military's personnel are relatively
well-matched to the difficulty of the weapon systems they are operating, the operators
usually extract most of the capability from those systems. A nation with such a match
factor would find itself high up on the schematic curve, shown in Figure 6.2. Conversely,
when a nation's military personnel fall short in their basic skills (education, training, and
experience) with respect to the demands of their weapon systems, they begin to fall down
the curve. At a certain point, where the demands of the systems far exceed the
capabilities of the personnel, the person-machine match factor can fall to almost zero.
(Leveen, 1983)
Based on Leveen's theory, one can expect that the percentage of conscripts in the
active forces will decrease with an increasing degree of technical complexity of combat
systems, because conscripts serving on a short-term basis no longer meet the
requirements regarding permanence in training and readiness for duty. The assumption is
that the effect of the level of military technology on the successful implementation of an
AVF is significant and positive. This means that the probability that a nation will change
its military system from a draft to an AVF increases with the increasing use of modern
combat systems. Haltiner (1997) also observes that the conscription format of a military
system is more dominant in military organizations whose level of military technology is
relatively low.
The positive effect will further be supported by the fact that highly tech-
nologically developed armed forces can offer more attractive jobs, especially for the
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younger generations in modern societies, and consequently find it easier to attract high-
quality applicants.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter introduces the so-called "Military Design Factors" and their
estimated effects on the successful implementation of an AVF. As previously noted and
shown in Figure 6.1, this component, determined mainly by the vision and strategy of
defense-planners, is a reaction to changes in external conditions. Organizations that want
to survive and prosper must respond to these changes to use resources efficiently and to
keep the level of productivity at its maximum.
After the end of the Cold War and a changing political and social environment,
the military faces basically the same issues. This situation results in the discussion in
many nations whether they should remove the draft and rely solely on all-volunteer
recruitment. The answer to this question depends largely on an assessment of whether or
not the existing system (i.e., the draft) meets the military's current and future needs. In
this decision- making process, defense planners have to consider following questions:
1
.
What are the task requirements of the military organization, and what must
people do to perform effectively, given its context?
2. What are the human resources, and are they adequate—in terms of
intellectual capability, military training, and expertise—to respond to
current and future challenges?
What is the basic military technology, and is it compatible with other
design factors, especially with the men and women who have to operate
and maintain it?
Does the existing military force structure deal with key interdependencies,
as shown in Figure 7.1, and the required need for integration?
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This chapter has estimated the effects of different "Military Design Factors" in the
light of these key issues, mentioned above. The analysis indicates that all of the
"Military Design Factors" are important considerations in a nation's decision of whether
to remove a draft. The research finds that a reduction in the length of military service, for
example, has a negative influence on the efficiency of a conscription system because of
higher turnover rates, a decrease in quality training and expertise, and, therefore, a
decline in military capability.
The "Conscription Ratio" is expected to have a positive effect on the decision to
implement an AVF for two reasons. First, armed forces with a lower CR already base
their force structure mainly on volunteers and, therefore, face fewer uncertainties and
restrictions on readiness and capabilities than do "Pseudo" or "Hard-Core Conscript"
forces; and further, the CR in almost all nations is highly related with the "Military
Participation Conscript Ratio." This means that a low CR implies a low MPCR, a
relationship that results in the burden of the conscription tax being levied on only a small
fraction of the population.
The discussion also shows the importance of considering the "Reserve Ratio,"
especially in combination with the "Average Conscript Ratio." One can anticipate that
the RR has a negative influence on the decision to remove the draft because of the fact
that military conscript systems tend to recruit their reserve forces out of the pool of
former draftees. Therefore, the removal of the draft has significant effects on the
recruiting policies of the reserve forces, as well.
Finally, Chapter VI emphasizes the need to consider the positive effect of the
level of military technology on the decision to end conscription. Based on Leveen's
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(1983) framework of soldiers proficiency and, in particular, on his "person-machine
match" function, one can be expect the percentage of conscripts in the active forces to
decrease as combat systems become more technologically complex. However, from a
personnel perspective, increased technology is a double-edged sword, as Maxwell R.
Thurman (1986) points out. On one hand, young men and women perceive it as a
drawing card for recruitment. At the same time, technology and the sophistication it
brings demand smarter soldiers.
52 See Maxwell R. Thurman, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force 1983-1992: The Second Decade," in
Bowman et al., eds., The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union
has raised the question in a number of nations, especially in Western Europe, over the
continuing need for compulsory military service. A decline in public and political
acceptance of the so-called "massarmies," combined with a decreasing willingness of
people to carry the burden of defense, exerts enormous pressure on defense-planners to
consider alternatives to their current military systems, particularly in nations with
compulsory military service.
According to Bonnardot (1997), new strategies and political circumstances affect
many related areas, such as military budget cuts and the reduction in military manpower
levels. This implies the need to reorganize military organizations. The concept of the
armed forces is decisively determined by what capabilities the military must have in the
future as a tool of a nation's foreign and security policies. Policy makers have to
consider, however, that forced military service presents the most extreme demand a
community can impose on its members—the requirement, as Cohen (1985) notes, that
they prepare to die on its behalf.
This paper develops a conceptual model that shows the estimated effects of
economic, social, political, and military factors on the successful implementation of an
AVF. The model, shown in Figure 7.1, demonstrates the open-system character of the
military organization and highlights the close interrelationship between social, military,
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The difficulty in developing such a conceptual model arises from the fact that it is
not easy to find reliable measure of military output, especially in peacetime. Figure 7.
1
shows a "feedback loop" between the output of the military and its environment. This
implies, as discussed in Chapter IV, that the success of the military organization is based
on four pillars: first, social acceptance and integration; second, economic effectiveness
and efficiency; third, military capability and readiness; and, finally, military credibility
with Congress, administration, the people and, also a nation's enemies or potential
enemies.
An all-volunteer military must, furthermore, be evaluated on its ability to recruit
the desired number and quality of personnel. This fact is becoming even more important
because, once compulsory military service is abolished, the armed forces must compete
with other employers and educational institutions for quality personnel. Effective and
efficient management of military manpower in an all-volunteer system is, thus, based on
an understanding of forces that determine the demand for and the supply of military
personnel. This understanding, combined with constant tracking and analysis of
economic, political, military, and social trends, enables decision makers to accomplish
two essential tasks: to locate key factors that determine the demand curve for and supply
curve of military personnel; and to develop a strategy, which manipulates these factors to
achieve military capability by using scarce resources effectively and efficiently.
The strategy used or, as Muchinsky (1996) notes, the "process of change," is
sometimes more important than the actual outcome because it ensures credibility for the
management and support of stakeholders in the future. The key to choosing the "right"
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strategy often lies in understanding the history and culture of an organization, a
comprehensive analysis of the present situation, and an awareness of factors that could
affect the desired outcome. Therefore, before answering the question of "where to go,"
responsible leaders must consider the questions "where are we?" and "where are we
from?" In evaluating the decision to implement an AVF, Fleckenstein (1988)
emphasizes the importance of considering a nation's historical experience with the
military. The discussion in Chapter III about different approaches to conceptualizing a
military organization shows that the military self-image and the relationship between the
armed forces and society can be as important as the military outcome itself. The
"institutional/occupational" model, first developed by Moskos can, therefore, be seen as
an attempt to conceptualize the effects of military policies both on military effectiveness
and on the relationship between the armed forces and society.
Many discussions about the effectiveness and efficiency of different military
systems center around cost comparisons between voluntary and conscript armed forces.
Although economic considerations are not the only inputs to the ultimate policy decision,
as Moskos (1988) suggests, it is clear that the resources and cost implications of various
policy options play a central role. It can be expected that policy makers will be strongly
influenced by the anticipated budget costs of military manpower when considering a
change to an AVF. For this reason, this paper suggests considering the following
variables: First, the "Military Participation Ratio"; second, the "Conscript-Volunteer Pay
Ratio"; third, the "Unemployment rate"; and finally, the "Gross National Product per
Capita." Figure 7.1 shows the estimated effects of these variables on the decision to
implement an AVF, holding everything else constant.
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Chapter V shows that one consequence of the draft is the so-called conscription
tax. The discussion emphasizes the need to consider the conscription tax for the
following reasons. First, the conscription tax is an important element of public policy
because it reduces the amount of direct taxes that the general public must pay. And,
second, it induces the equity issue and questions about who should carry the burden of
conscription. For those forced into the military, the burden of military service has many
components—the interruption in their lives, the risk of life and limb, and the financial
penalties from having to forgo productive civilian employment, to name but a few. The
imposition of this burden does not, in itself, constitute inequity. Rather, the inequity of
selective service derives from the selective way, as Cooper (1977) puts is, that the burden
is shared: some have to serve, while others do not. This thesis, therefore, assumes that
the "Military Participation Conscript Ratio" is significant and has a negative effect on the
decision to abolish compulsory military service.
Chapter VI introduces the so-called "Military Design Factors." As Nadler and
Tushman (1991) state, organizations are made up of components or parts that interact
en
with each other. These components exist in states of relative balance, consistency, or
"fit" with each other. The different parts of the organization can fit well together and
thus function effectively; or, they can fit poorly, leading to problems. Therefore, the
reason to consider this component is the fact that it provides information about the
structure and functionality of the military organization and, here especially, the question
about the efficient use of resources.
See David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational
Behavior," in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland, The Organizational Behavior Reader.
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The assumption is that all four factors in the conceptual model—social, military,
political, and economic—are highly correlated and have a significant influence on the
outcome of the military organization (i.e., military capability and readiness). To omit one
of these variables in evaluating the decision to implement an AVF would lead to bias and
pitfalls in the policy analysis process. However, as Figure 7.1 shows, the main focus in
this paper is on economic considerations and the question about the fit between different
key components in the military organization, or the so-called "Military Design Factors."
Because political and military factors did not receive particular attention, the paper
recognizes limitations in its ability to predict the estimated effects of the variables under
observation.
Therefore, this thesis recommends a follow-up study that locates and analyzes the
effects of political and military factors. The combination of both studies would provide a
basis for the design of a quantitative model that could be used to assess whether a specific
country with compulsory military service possesses the conditions for successful conver-
sion to an all-volunteer system.
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